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ABSTRACT
The definition of political risk and the methodology of its assessment have changed since
the inception of the discipline midway through the last century. This assignment assesses
the usefulness of a new quantitative technique that uses political constraints and the policy
preferences of political actors to construct a measure of political risk. Integrating the
findings of the resulting Political Constraints Index with an analysis of the political
economy of the Indian Electricity Sector, the assignment demonstrates that, contrary to the
original interpretations of the index, high levels of political constraints and political
competition may propagate a disabling policy regime and be detrimental to the investor,
despite the stated commitment of the incumbent government to policy reform. The
implication of these findings is that, to avoid incorrect interpretation, the Political
Constraint Index should be augmented by a comprehensive qualitative assessment of the
industry in question.
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OPSOMMING
Die definisie van politieke risiko en die metodologie om dit te ontleed, het verander sedert
die onstaan van hierdie dissipline gedurende die middel van die laaste eeu. Hierdie opdrag
ontleed die nuttigheid van 'n nuwe kwantitatiewe tegniek wat die politieke beperkings en
beleidsvoorkeure van politieke rolspelers gebruik om 'n maatstaf van politieke risiko te
verskaf. Die opdrag se integrasie van die bevindinge van die resulterende Politeke
Beperkings Indeks met 'n analise van die politieke ekonomie van die Indiese Elektrisiteits
Sektor bewys dat, teenstrydig met oorspronklike interpretasies van die indeks, hoe vlakke
van politieke beperkings en politieke kompetisie 'n deaktiveringsbeleid regime kan kweek
wat nadelig is vir die bel egger, ten spyte van die huidige regering se verklaarde
toegewydheid tot beleidshervorming. Die implikasie van hierdie bevindinge is dat, om
foutiewe interpretasie te vermy, die Politieke Beperkings Indek verbeter moet word deur 'n
omvattende kwalitatiewe ontleding van die verlangde industrie.
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"In nearly every economic crisis
the root cause is political, not econom ic"
Lee Kuan Yew
Senior Minister and former Prime Minister of Singapore
addressing a Fortune 500 Forum
Boston, Mass, November 1997
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
"When J took over as Minister of Power in October last year, J realised that
the Power Sector was at the crossroads and if the trend of the nineties were
to continue, power supply would deteriorate further and have adverse
impact on the economy and citizens. J have been sharing my anxiety with
opinion makers and emphasizing that unless we take urgent measures ... it
would be difficult to avert the impending crisis. Reform cannot be delayed
anyfurther. "- Suresh Prabhu, Minister of Power, August 14,2001.
The words of the Indian Power Minister emphasise the dire straits the Indian Electricity
Sector finds itself in at the beginning of the 21 st century. The country's inability to provide
access to reliable power at reasonable cost is significantly hindering much needed
economic growth.
Conservatively, the shortfall in electricity India-wide is estimated at 11 per cent for regular
and 18 per cent for peak hour demand (World Bank 2002:6). This lack of power
infrastructure elevates the cost of doing business in India; a World Bank survey showed
that 69 per cent of Indian firms ran their own generators, compared to 30 per cent in
neighbouring China (World Bank 2002:6). As the electricity industry is characterised by
large economies of scale, private, small-scale electricity generation is highly cost-
inefficient. Operating a generator can consume as much as one-sixth of a small- to
medium-sized company's capital. The result of this is that energy costs in certain industries
in India are sometimes double those of competing industries in Indonesia, the Philippines
and Thailand.
A central reason for the poor performance of the electricity sector is the country's history of
state control over the generation and distribution of power. Prior to the 1990's, electricity
1
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production was monopolised by government owned enterprises acting under the auspices
of State Electricity Boards (SEBs). These Boards followed deliberate policies of cross-
subsidising the electricity costs of powerful voting groups like households and farms at the
expense of business. Such strategies were only partly successful and losses were borne by
the Boards themselves. This, combined with the inability of the SEBs to collect bills and
prevent theft of power, led to a severe shortage of capital for reinvestment and,
consequently, a serious underinvestment in maintenance and capacity.
In 1991, the Indian government began the process of opening the Indian economy to
market principles. During this phase it was decided to liberalise the electricity sector in the
hope of attracting foreign producers to make up the shortfall in capacity. Such efforts have
had limited success, partly because of the absence of a regulatory framework in which
potential investors have confidence (World Bank 2002:7).
As the comments of the Minister indicate, Indian leadership has recognised the need to take
strong steps to rebuild the sector. This has not been easy. The history of state intervention
in the sector, the complexities of the Indian federal system and the large number of vocal
and influential stakeholders in the electricity game have made essential changes difficult to
implement. Despite this, the Indian government professes a commitment to the sustained
reform of the sector in accordance with market principles. Most recently, the much vaunted
and hotly debated Electricity Bill was passed with the intent to instil investor confidence by
consolidating a slew of previously instituted reforms.
Previous abortive reform attempts and the past experiences of foreign investors have set a
bad precedent for investment in the sector that continues to scare multinational corporations
(MNCs) away from a large and potentially lucrative market. India is seen as an unreliable
destination for investment because changes of government at national or state level have
often precipitated attempts to renegotiate agreements with investors (Rufin et aI2003:654).
In 1992, for example, Enron, a large US-based company, was invited to bid for a power
project to be established in the Indian state of Maharashtra. A power purchase agreement
was concluded between the Houston giant and the state government amidst a shroud of
secrecy and allegations of under-handed dealings. Shortly after the project's inception,
elections in Maharashtra brought to power a new government that sought to scrap the
2
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agreement without compensation and at huge cost to the foreign investor. Enron officials
reportedly mobilised senior US-government officials to apply pressure to the Indian central
government to force a more equitable resolution. Since then other infrastructure investors
such as Cogentrix and Electricite de France have announced plans to withdraw from the
country (Rufin et al 2003:654). Defaults on power payments are spreading (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2003:3).
Assessment of risk is a crucial component of any investigation into a potential investment
opportunity. Political and regulatory risks, in particular, may have significant influence on
the value of the firm (Ellestrand et al 2002:771). As Enron discovered, these risks are
harder to quantify and therefore more difficult to measure than other forms of investment
risk, yet can have equally far-reaching consequences.
A large body of literature has developed surrounding the topic of political risk and various
methods of assessing risk have been suggested and debated I. Henisz (2000, 2002) has
recently devised a new tool to be used for political risk assessment, the Political Constraints
Index (PCl), contending that it can be used as a measure of policy stability within a
country'.
According to Henisz, countries that rank relatively highly on the index should have policy
regimes that are less susceptible to change and therefore should present lower levels of
political risk. Such countries should be preferred destinations for foreign investment. This
conclusion, while possibly true under certain circumstances, relies on the implicit
assumption that the initial policy regime is beneficial to the investor. When initial policies
are not favourable to the investor (as can be argued for the example of the Indian Electricity
Sector), it seems intuitive that high political constraints index may propagate a disabling
policy regime that will be detrimental to the MNC's return on investment.
This intuition leads the assignment to suggest an alternate interpretation of the Political
Constraints Index. When the reform of economic institutions, particularly politically
sensitive ones, is required, a high level of political constraints may tend to work against
1 ,\ number of these will be discussed below.
2 So far the tool has only been used for high-level, cross-country risk analysis - appropriate for theoretical srudies, but less
useful ro the investor.
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change. By limiting the opportunity for positive policy reform, relatively high political
constraints may, in contrast to the interpretation offered by Henisz, indicate riskier
investments. This, if true, has important implications for the use of the PCI in the
assessment of political risk. Firstly, the index cannot be used in a simplistic fashion, as
doing so may deliver spurious results. Secondly, the PCI may demonstrate a policy stability
that will hinder or even derail attempts at policy reform. Thirdly, the PCI, to be useful as an
investor's tool, may need to be augmented with a comprehensive understanding of the
political economy of the country and, specifically, the sector under investigation. This
alternative interpretation must be investigated and the impact of these implications
assessed.
This assignment will revisit the literature on political risk assessment to point out and
discuss shortcomings in existing methodologies in the field. It will critically evaluate the
Political Constraints Index, assess where and how it overcomes the limitations of other
methodologies and discuss some of its weaknesses. The assignment will consider the
political economy of the Indian Electricity Sector and its recent reform history, evaluate the
predictions of the PCI against OCCUITences in the Indian Electricity Sector and, for
comparison purposes, those of China and Brazil, and suggest how the Index can and should
be augmented and interpreted to become a useful assessment tool for the investor'. Lastly,
new areas to be researched will be identified.
In summary, the assignment has four main goals:
• To provide insight into the literature in the field of political risk;
• To critically discuss reforms in the Indian Electricity sector and provide
commentary relevant to investors;
• To evaluate the PCI in the context of economic reform in India and in the Indian
Electricity Sector in particular; and
• To suggest how the PCI can be augmented to become more useful to the investor.
3 The Indian Elcctriciry Sector is an ideal backdrop for an evaluation of the PCl because of the recent attempts that have
been made to reform it and because of its susceptibility ro political influence. While the Indian Electricity Sector will
remain the focus of this assignment, it is useful, in the interests of evaluating the PCI, to compare India's experience
with those of China and Hrazil, as all three countries have been exposed to similar challenges. This will be elaborated
below.
4
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1.2 Structure
The content of the assignment can be grouped into four chapters:
• Chapter 1, Introduction, provides a rationale for the assignment in the context of the
Indian Electricity Sector and the structure that the argument will follow. It
continues to explore salient definitions in political risk assessment that have been
used in both the academic literature and in the private sector and discusses how
these definitions can be categorised. This provides the definitional foundation upon
which the rest of the argument will be constructed.
• Chapter 2, The Theory of Political Risk Assessment, begins by exploring the
possible causes of political risk for the MNC, discussing how risk can be seen to
derive from the changing relationship between the host government and the
investor. This understanding of the causes of risk is required before a useful
discussion of the methods of assessing risk can be pursued. With possible causes
established, the chapter continues to categorise and evaluate various methodologies
that have been used to assess political risk, dividing them into two primary
groupings, subjective and objective methods. The use of cross-national data to
determine the efficacy of various political risk methodologies is briefly considered.
Finally, the chapter introduces and evaluates a new approach to political risk
assessment, the Political Constraints Index, indicating how this technique can be
placed within the context of the other methodologies and suggesting how to
augment the index so that it can be used as a useful adjunct during the investment
decision.
• Chapter 3, 171ePolitical Economy of the Indian Electricity Sector, returns the
argument to its Indian backdrop, beginning with an overview of the current political
structure of the country and the important political actors and groupings in the
Indian political arena. The chapter charts the progress of the Indian reform process
and critically discusses how this process has been both hindered and helped by
internal and external economic and political considerations. The argument is then
narrowed to the power sector, tracing its recent history, its inefficiencies and crises,
5
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•and the reform attempts that have thus far failed to address the root causes of its
problems. The discussion emphasises the impact of political interference in the
sector, the extent to which lobby groups and patronage can influence decision-
making and the need for sustainable SEB reform. The chapter concludes by
introducing and critically evaluating the newly passed Electricity Bill 2001.
Chapter 4, Analysis of the PCI and Concluding Remarks, derives the index for India
and, using the previous discourse on economic reform in the country and the
electricity sector in particular as a foundation, discusses the predictions of the index
and implications for its use in assessing risk. The argument is supported by
examples taken from the reform experiences of China and Brazil which, because of
the similar development challenges that these countries have faced, are able to
assist in the assessment of the PCI. The chapter and the assignment conclude with a
brief summation of the arguments presented and some suggestions for possible
areas for further research into the use of the constraints index for the purposes of
the MNC.
1.3 Definitions in Political Risk Assessment
The assignment begins with an overview of the existing definitions of political risk,
categorising them and appraising some of their strengths and weaknesses and, by so doing,
creating a necessary link to the existing literature. This is an important step because, as
scholars such as Clark and Tunaru (2003: 126), Moran (1999:3), Sethi and Luther
(1986:58), Kobrin (1979:67) and Robock (1971:7) point out, there is no single universally
accepted definition of political risk. Without a thoroughly grounded argument there exists
the danger of confusion. This section brings together some leading thoughts in the political
risk field in an attempt to show what political risk is.
1.3.1 The Need for Definition
Perhaps a possible reason for this lack of definitional conformity can be derived from the
diverse uses that political risk assessments have been put to in the past and the great
variance in the backgrounds of those who are active in the field. The political risk
6
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discipline is not solely the province of the academic - political risk assessments are a
crucial and integral part of the business operations of multinational firms, and the great
demand for accurate risk predictions has resulted in a vast private industry of risk
assessment services. While the academics struggled with the problems of defining political
risk, the industry proceeded to develop its own definitions that suited its markets and its
business needs.
The academia was not as pressed for a pragmatic interpretation of risk as the business
world and continued to debate the issue, developing a series of definitions with their own
distinctions. That disagreement should arise within academia itself is hardly surprising,
given the varied backgrounds of the students of political risk. Economists, business
management students and political scientists have each approached the subject differently,
emphasizing certain aspects and simplifying others".
Those who practice the art of political risk analysis tend to overlook the need for a
consistent and accurate definition, leading to a lack of agreement that has complicated the
comparison of different assessment approaches and resulted in a number of discrepancies
on methodological issues. Poorly defined arguments have greatly weakened the dialogue
surrounding the study of political risk, and the tendency of both professional analysts and
scholars alike to proceed without a sound definitional underpinning has led to the incorrect
selection of data, the use of inappropriate analytical tools and the misinterpretation of
findings.
Sethi and Luther warn that the dangers of such disparities in definition are an
overestimation of the usefulness of the results of a study, and the real possibility that an
assessment could deliver the wrong answers (1986:59). Even though the authors were
writing in the mid-eighties, these problems and their effects can still be seen and felt today.
1.3.2 A Framework for Definitions of Political Risk
Before exploring a topic in political risk, it is necessary to understand these different
definitions, how they relate to each other, how they have evolved, and how they are
" l-or examples of economists in rhc field see Schiffer and Wedel" (2000), Ilanns (2002a), l Iarrns (2002b) and Feils and
Sabac (2000), Business managcment articles include 1':lIstrand et aj (2002), I lowell and Chaddick (1994), Howell (1996)
and .rccn (1972), An often quoted and widely published political scienrisr is Stephen Kobrin,
7
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relevant to some situations and not to others. Once that understanding has been achieved, a
useful and applicable definition of political risk can be developed and defended and an
appropriate methodology for risk assessment constructed.
Narrow definitions of political risk have surfaced through the years. These are usually
adopted by MNCs and are not well suited to academic discourse on the topic. Consider, for
example, Shell Oil's definition of political risk as the "probability of not maintaining an oil
contract during a period of 10 years in the face of changing economic and political
circumstances" (Chermak 1992: 168). Clearly, such definitions and the analyses that are
based upon them do not lend themselves usefully to comparison with other studies in
political risk. Their strength is that they allow the firm in question to focus explicitly on its
own issues of strategic concern.
Other definitions of political risk are more ambitious in scope and a definitional framework
becomes a useful tool to put them in perspective. This assignment suggests a simple three
category framework to organise the definitions, differentiating categories according to the
transmission mechanism through which government influences the firms.
The decision was taken to group definitions according to how they view the interaction
between government and investor because doing so provides a strong base for weighing
their strengths and determining which can best support the objectives of the eventual
political risk assessment At the simplest level, all members of the three categories include
the concept that the presence of political risk will have an impact on the profitability of the
investing company.
1.3.2.1 Category One
Definitions that fall into the first category consider the direct actions that governments take
to influence the operations of a particular firm or those of films in a particular industry.
Typically implicit in these definitions is the assumption that government action will
S The framework described here is loosely based on the four category framework that Fitzpatrick (1983) developed.
6 Not all definitions will fit comfortably into the categories described. The diverse nature of the discipline makes it
debatable whether a perfectly accurate framework could be created with fewer categories than the sum total of
definitions in the field. Broad definitions may also be too broad for this framework and it becomes nece 'sary to consider
the way in which the definition is used before assigning it to a category. This implies some level of interpretation.
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necessarily lead to negative outcomes for the investor and that government inaction does
not constitute a source of risk to the MNC.
Risk analysis in the 1960s and 1970s tended to be concerned with one particular event that
was directly initiated by government - the expropriation or confiscation of foreign owned
'assets by host governments. This is illustrated by Truitt's definition in 1974 of political risk
as the "propensity to expropriate" (Chermak 1992: 168)7. Definitions that allow the
assessment of risks related to expropriation, so-called "creeping" expropriation,
discriminatory taxation, public sector competitron and the explicit breach of investment
agreements would be accounted for by this category".
Figure I: Category One Relationships
Figure 1 illustrates the simple relationship that exists between the government and the firm
for definitions in category one.
1.3.2.2 Category Two
The second category builds on the first by identifying political risk in terms of occurrences
of a political nature, usually political events, as well as constraints imposed at the specific
industry or firm level. These events are typically changes in government or heads of state
and politically motivated violence. In this grouping, both direct and indirect actions and
7 I~arly studies of political risk, such as Truitt's, concentrated on the act of expropriation (the confiscation of privately
owned assets by the host government). It is interesting to note that the incidence of such acts fell from 336 between
1970 and 1975 to 15 between 1980 and 1985 to only one between 1986 and 1992 (Minor 1994). hom this it stems that
definitions that limit rhcrnsclvcs to expropriation arc no longer useful to the investor.
8 Weston and Sorge's definition provides a good example: "[Ploliricai risks arise from the actions of national governments
which interfere with or prevent business transactions, or change the terms of agreements, or cause the confiscation of
whoUy or partially foreign owned business property" (1972:60). See also Schmidt (1986) who defines political risk to be
"the application of host government policies that constrain the business operations of a given foreign investment". I Ie
subdivides risk into three main categories "transfer risk", concerning risk to capital payments; "operational risk", with
threats over local source or content; and "ownership control risk", high-lighting possibilities of expropriation or
confiscation. lurthcr examples arc Wang ct 01 (1999), and Nehn (1972).
9
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inaction by government can result in risk to the investment - rioting or similar politically
motivated violence, for example, being the possible indirect outcome of sovereign action or
inaction9.
It is often business that considers political risk in terms congruent with this category
because it is convenient to do so for the purposes of purchasing insurance cover. The US
government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insures US businesses
against loss resulting from expropriation, inconvertibility, war damage, civil strife damage,
and breach of contract (Howell 1994:7). For the damage to be considered "political", the
contract must be repudiated in such a way that the loss of revenue can be described as
resulting from government decision making.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships that category two definitions encompass. As well as
having direct influence on the firm, the government affects the body politic through its
actions or inactions which in tum could have influence on the investor.
..,~~~~~~
/:~~o~,/''''''\
/" T ,/.<, .:
',-,'
Figure 2: Category Two Relationships
9 Butler and .Joa(juin speak of political risk in terms of a sovereign host government changing the "rules of the game" under
which investors operate (1998:599). According to them, this has a profound impact on the MNC because instability in a
host government or in monetary or fiscal policies results in more uncertain investment outcomes. Their approach is
event focused. See also I~I-Tabtabai & Alex (2000), Green (1972), Wells (1995) and Moran (1999).
10
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1.3.2.3 Category Three
The third category concentrates on the political environment, rather than the actions of
players in isolation. The typical definition in this category focuses on the discontinuities in
the business environment that arise from political change, which pose a risk if they are able
to affect the profit or other goals of a particular enterprise. From this it follows that
f1uctuations in the political environment that do not change the business environment
should not be considered as a source of political risk for international business1o.
Figure 3: Category Three Relationships
Figure 3 illustrates this category. Government influences the political environment, which
impacts on the business environment in tum. The firm is susceptible to changes in the
business environment, so changes to the political environment are able to filter through to
affect the film's profitability.
Definitions in each succeeding category tend to encompass more sources of political risk
than those in the one before. The first two deal with specific events and the level of risk
associated with that event. Deeper than the first category of definitions, the second
encompasses both direct actions from governments and other political activity over which
the government has indirect and limited control, such as violence and regime change. The
10 Consider l Iowcll and Chaddick's definition of political risk as the "possibility that political decisions, events, or
conditions in a country [... [ will affect the business environment such that investors lose monel' or have a reduced profit
margin" (1994:71). Note that the assumption is that political risk will have a ncgative impact on thc firm. Other authors
whose explicit or implicit definitions can be put in this category arc Clark & Tunaru (2003:127), Ilarms (2002a), Ilarms
(2002b), Robeck (19717), Simon (1982:68), l l owcll (1996:7), and Alon & Martin (1998:12).
11
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third category considers the political environment, how it is shaped and influenced by
political events, and how it in tum impacts on the business environment.
The framework illustrates a significant weakness associated with some past and current
definitions of political risk. By concentrating either on the actions of government or on how
the political environment influences business, the interdependent nature of the various
spheres is overlooked. Environmental changes can prompt government actions as much as
government activity can provoke environmental developments (Sethi and Luther 1986:59).
This simple yet significant two-way causality should not be ignored.
Definitions in these categories tend to ignore the ongoing political process and its subtle
forms of change, concentrating instead on sudden changes in the political environment.
This means that they predict political event risk, rather than political risk itself. The
popularity of such approaches can be explained: large shifts in government policy and the
general political environment are easy to discern, and their causal links to political risk are
relatively easy to describe, whereas the cumulative effects of change are more difficult to
anticipate.
If, as Fitzpatrick postulates, the nature of politics is a "continuous process rather than a
discrete series of events" (1983:250), a risk analysis that focuses solely on events will lose
a great deal of its predictive capability. The assessment of political risk, then, must involve
process variables as well as event variables, an issue which remains relevant to a discussion
of definitions, but which will become more central when the question of methodology is
raised.
1.3.3 A Working Definition
Chermak, in 1992, develops a useful definition of political risk that incorporates many of
the concerns raised above and which will be used throughout the argument presented here.
He adds a probability element to Iodice's definition of 1985 so that political risk becomes
the probability of:
12
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"rC}hanges in the operating conditions offoreign enterprises that arise out
of political process, either directly through war, insurrection, or political
violence, or through changes in government policies that affect the
ownership and behaviour oftheflrm. Political risk can be conceptualized as
events, or a series of events, in the national and international
environments that can affect the physical assets, personnel and operations
of thefirm" (1985 in Chermak 1992. Emphasis added).
This definition implicitly allows for the analysis of two-way causalities between political
actors (firms, governments and environments), explicitly encompasses both political
processes and the events that result from them, considers the impact of factors beyond the
domestic political environment and acknowledges that risk is the probability that the
political environment will affect the firm's ownership and bottom-line.
Figure 4: Relationships in the Definition
Figure 4 shows the relationships that are catered for by this definition. By including more
sources of risk, a more complete picture of the political risk environment can be achieved
and a more accurate risk assessment performed.
13
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Further, it is important to note that this definition does not limit risk to changes inimical to
the business. The possibility of both favourable and unfavourable change is included. This
will become important later on in the discussion when it becomes apparent that, in the
context of the Indian electricity sector and this argument, it is the lack of positive change
that is more dangerous to the investor than the possibility of negative change. The nature of
the Indian electricity sector, the incentives for investment offered by government and the
promises made to continue needed reforms in the industry make this so.
1.3.4 Macro and Micro Risk
A short detour must briefly distinguish between two important concepts in political risk
analysis: macro and micro risks. The first type is defined by Kobrin to be "environmental
events which affect all foreign films in a country", as opposed to the second, which are
"risks specific to an industry, a firm, or even a project" (1982:35).
Frei and Ruloff believe that micro risk is far more important than macro risk in the context
of a risk analysis (1987:4). They argue that an assessment, for it to be of worth, must be
conducted from the perspective of a specific business project, and use the examples of oil
extraction in Angola and asbestos cement shingle production in Germany to prove their
point.
In Angola, oil extraction was a highly profitable business venture during the civil war,
despite the fact that the country was ravaged by violence. From the macro risk perspective,
the country was a disaster area, and a very dangerous and unprofitable investment. In micro
terms, however, the characteristics of the industry would have led to a very different
assessment: protection by Cuban troops allowed Gulf Oil to maintain and profit from its
operations, despite the turmoil in the country. Micro risk was at a minimum.
In the second example, the early eighties' business climate in Germany was conducive to
the production of asbestos shingles. A few years later, a small clause in a certain law
shi fted the burden of proof regarding the toxicity of asbestos products away from the
plaintiff and onto the producers. The industry was effectively destroyed. In this case,
although macro risk virtually did not exist, the micro risk proved devastating.
14
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1.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the field of political risk assessment, with its varied actors and
objectives, has suffered from a lack of definitional clarity. To put the assignment's
argument on a firm footing, it has created a simple framework to show how definitions can
be differentiated according to the way that they allow for the interaction of government and
investor.
Using the framework, the chapter has elucidated some weaknesses in existing definitions
and has suggested a useful definition that overcomes most of them, highlighting the need to
consider the influences that the external and internal political environments have on the
government and vice versa. The definition also includes political processes, the events that
result from these processes and does not assume that change necessarily has unwanted
impact on the MNC.
15
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2 THE THEORY OF POLITICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT
2.1 Introduction
Since the nineties, developing countries have often been eager to act as hosts for the
operations of multinationals. Foreign investment brings with it production technology,
skills, innovative capacity and new organizational and managerial practices, while adding
to the stock of domestic resources and increasing capital formation (Blanchard 2000:470).
Desiring these benefits, governments seek to attract foreign capital by devising incentive
schemes that make investment potentially lucrative for the multinational corporation. These
schemes are typically formalised through contractual agreement between the host and the
MNC.
Host govemments, however, do not necessarily honour such agreements throughout the
lifetime of the contract, possibly leading to considerable loss of revenue for the investor.
This chapter considers the trends in foreign participation in infrastructure projects in the
developing world and important issues in the contemporary era that suggest on-going
sources of threat to the MNC. It presents a theory that describes the changing relationship
between the host country and the investor over time and makes the point that infrastructure
investments are particularly prone to government supervision. In synthesising these
different arguments, reasons are presented for why political risk exists for the international
investor in infrastructure.
Having established possible causes of political risk, the chapter tackles the problem of how
to assess risk, revisiting the literature and categorising the methods that can be found there
into two groups: subjective and objective. Methods in both categories have their respective
strengths and weaknesses and some of these are briefly considered, along with the use of
cross-national data to test empirically the efficacy of the risk assessment approaches. With
these foundations in place, the chapter introduces the political constraints index and various
political risk methodologies are briefly considered. Finally, the chapter introduces and
16
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evaluates a new approach to political risk assessment, the Political Constraints Index,
indicating how this technique can be placed within the context of the other methodologies
and suggesting how to augment the index so that it can be used as a useful adjunct during
the investment decision.
2.2 Causes of Political Risk
2.2.1 Trends in Private Participation in Infrastructure
In 1990, investments in private infrastructure projects totalled only $18 billion (Harris
2003:5)11. Annual investment grew rapidly from this low base and the decade recorded an
average yearly investment of $60 billion in projects with private participation. The trend
peaked in 1997; since then, private investment in infrastructure has seen a marked decline,
although aggregate figures are still high. By 2001, developing countries had seen nearly
$755 billion flow into more than 2500 private infrastructure projects (Harris 2003:6).
11 l-igures are expressed in 2001 US dollars and arc taken from the World Bank's Private Participation in Infrastrucrure
Project Database (I larris 2003:5). Although these figures i.nclude both public and private investment in these projects,
the World Bank estimates that private financing accounts for between 85 and 90 per cent of total investment flows
averaged over sectors and regions (Ilarris 2003:5).
17
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The figures show that developing countries have become more receptive to foreign capital.
The upswing in investment during the nineties, however, does not necessarily indicate that
the inherent risk of the investment environment has been transformed. Despite a number of
emerging markets embracing more investor-friendly stances, commercial and political risks
still remain problematic.
Renegotiation of contracts is a common dilemma. A World Bank study shows that over 50
per cent of concessions offered to attract foreign investment into the electricity industry are
re-negotiated within 10 years (Sarkar & Sharma 2001 :5). According to the study, most
renegotiation takes place relatively soon after the award (an average time of 2.2 years)13.
As infrastructure investments are typically long term projects with high initial capital
requirements, early renegotiation implies large losses in planned revenue.
12 Originally sourced from the World Bank PPI Projects Database and reproduced here from I farris (2003:7). It should be
noted that rhc graph shows yearly flows and not cumulative investments.
13 The study shows that renegotiations are more likely whcn concessions are awarded on the basis of lowest bid tariff and
less likely when a regula rot)' body oversees the concessions or when tariffs arc based upon cost of service rather than
lowest bid.
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Other industries are also heavily affected. Over forty per cent of concessions granted to
foreign investors in the Latin American water and transport sectors during the nineties have
been renegotiated (Guasch 2003:5). As in the electricity sector, these renegotiations
occurred early in the lives of the projects - sixty per cent occurred within three years of the
concession's award, when, in principle, the agreement was for a period of 15 to 30 years.
Investment in private infrastructure is clearly still risky. Moran (1999:7) lists important
trends in the contemporary era that suggest possible reasons for this risk.
• The decline in authoritarian states allows more leeway for political violence in the
form of ethnic tensions and separatist movements.
• The spread of democratisation enhances the importance of popular opinion and
populist reactions.
• The decentralisation of power and the heightened role of the sub-national state
increase the complexity of decision making, possibly affecting the stability of the
investment environment.
As a result of these trends there may be enhanced motivation for "opportunistic" behaviour
by host country political authorities.
The influence of all three factors mentioned by Moran can be felt in India and its electricity
sector in particular. While these recent trends do help to explain why risk has persisted
despite the relatively widespread advent of democracy and the recent enthusiasm for liberal
investment regimes amongst developing nations, it is also useful to consider a more robust
theory explaining the existence of political risk.
2.2.2 The "Obsolescing Bargain" Hypothesis
The ability of governments to alter the terms of an initial investment and to renege on
incentives can be explained by Vernon's description of the power dynamics between host
governments and foreign firms (1980). Vernon centred his original argument, which he
termed the "obsolescing bargain" hypothesis, on the changes in relative power between the
19
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two parties over the lifetime of a mining project". The theory predicts that passage of time
will result in the erosion of the multinational's bargaining position 15.
Initially, the firm holds the majority of the bargaining power because the host government
lacks the necessary capital, technology and expertise for resource extraction. Being unable
to develop its own mining operation, the country occupies a weak bargaining position and
will make heavy concessions to the foreign company to entice it to invest. Consequently,
the initial investment contract will be weighted in the investor's favour.
Once the investment is complete and the mining operation has begun, the power structure
suffers a rapid alteration. Domestic workers begin to move up a learning curve and the
local industry starts to absorb the new technologies that the company brought with its
operation. Foreign knowledge and expertise become less important.
As the mine cannot be physically moved and because most of the costs of establishing the
venture are sunk, the host government is now in a strong position to renegotiate a more
attractive contract, while the investor faces only two possibilities: continuing its operation,
but at lower revenues than originally planned, or losing its entire investment to
expropriation, with or without appropriate compensation". As the lifespan of the project
grows, variations in remuneration, taxation, or the regulatory environment tend to have an
increasing impact on profitability.
14 The obsolescing bargain hypothesis was created to analyse the treatment of foreign direct investors in natural resources.
Despite this focus, it can be generalised to explain the evolution of relations between aU types of investors and host
governments, particularly those related to private infrastructure projects (Moran 1999:8).
15 Other causes of political risk were put forward before the "obsolescing bargain" hypothesis. Bronfenbrenner (1954)
suggested that expropriation could be explained in terms of the tangible economic benefits that accrue to the country. I-Ie
hypothesized that confiscation could be a viable development alternative by increasing the rate of economic
development. I Iisrory has largely disproved his views. Examples such as the na rionalization of US operated copper mines
in Chile and the nationalization of the Zambian and Zaire copper mines show that confiscation does not necessarily lead
to greater rates of economic growth (Chermak 1992:169). Johnson'S (1965) explanation for expropriation distances itself
from economic rationale, suggesting instead that non-rational, ideological, or even emotional factors could be causes. In
short, the governing elites of a country and the population in general are considered to be willing to sacrifice material
advantage for the satisfaction of nationalistic acts, such as the confiscation of foreign controlled companies and the
displacement of foreign nationals in highly paid jobs. l l is hypothesis is difficult to verify empirically and is mostly
speculative in nature (Chermak 1992: 169).
16 Although traditional expropriation (the loss of ownership per se) was the consequence Vernon envisioned, the theory
holds for other methods of interference. Government meddling can also be indirect and implemented through subtle
means (Bergara e/ a/ '1998:20). Attempts may be made to restrict the company's pricing flexibility, the company may be
required to undertake particular investments, purchasing or employment patterns, or the government may try to restrict
the movement of capital. These less transparent activities will impact negatively on the profirabiliry of the enterprise and
assist the government's objectives, be those to recoup losses from concessions granted or to win favour amongst voters.
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The erosion of the multinational's bargaining power is reflected in lower bargaining
success, which is a measure of how close the deal negotiated is to the objectives of the host
country, rather than to those of the foreign firm (Vachani 1995: 161).
2.2.3 Incentives for Intervention
Private infrastructure projects, such as power, water, transport or communication services,
tend to be more susceptible to government supervision and intervention than other forms of
investment. This is a consequence of the political economy of the project and the broad
spectrum of players who have an interest in how it is conducted.
There are five main factors that make infrastructure regulation attractive to governments
(Bergara et al 1998: 19, Sarkar & Sharma 2001 :1, Moran 1999:3).
• As the obsolescing bargain hypothesis states, once large scale direct investment has
been undertaken costs tend to become sunk and mostly irreversible. Pay back
periods stretch into the long term, and the balance of bargaining power shifts
dramatically.
• The impact of economies of scale in the infrastructure sector helps to make these
sectors natural monopolies. Governments will keep a wary eye on their operations
because of this and are more likely to playa prominent role in the regulation of
entry, prices, quality of services and other aspects of investor behaviour.
Monopolies provide the opportunity for greater rents and therefore an incentive for
government scrutiny and possibly intervention.
• Infrastructure tends to be massively consumed, implying that the scope of the
services provided in fields such as power, water, transport, and telecommunications
will add further incentive for interference. Broad consumer bases are also broad
voter bases. If prices rise or services deteriorate, popular protest could be very
damaging to an incumbent government, suggesting that intervention in the interest
of averting broad popular protest will be considered a worthy cause. This also
introduces new stakeholders, consumer groups, with both direct and indirect
influence on the operation.
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• Government-owned companies tend to be key suppliers to, or purchasers from,
private infrastructure firms. Governments may be tempted to regulate their
suppliers or purchasers to manipulate revenues.
• Private infrastructure operations seldom involve export operations. As a result, they
tend to rely on host country agencies to ensure currency convertibility and
remission. This makes them particularly susceptible to government exchange rate
policy.
2.2.4 Ability and Motive
Vernon's obsolescing bargain establishes the ability of government to interfere in the
operations of the infrastructure investor. Modem trends that allow and reward
"opportunistic" behaviour, the massive consumption of outputs, economies of scale and
natural monopolies provide motive.
With motive and ability established the host's decision to expropriate or behave adversely
to the investor's interest rests on possible consequences. Expropriation of sunk assets or
attempts to appropriate revenues may be profitable to government if the direct costs (such
as the reputation lost in the eyes of foreign investors and the global community) and the
indirect costs (for example the institutional damage that will result from disregarding the
judiciary or ignoring administrative procedure) are small when compared to the short-term
benefits of such an action (such as being re-elected). From this it derives that incentives for
expropriation or adverse behaviour are greatest in countries where there are no formal or
informal governmental procedures for regulatory decision making, where regulatory policy
is centralised in the administration, where the judiciary is weak and unable to review policy
making, and where the expected lifespan of the incumbent government is relatively short
(Bergara et al 1999:20).
2.3 The Methodology of Political Risk Assessment
Prior to 1950, political risk was considered to be the field of international diplomacy and
international law, and concerned itself with very little other than the possibility of
confiscation and the likelihood of subsequent compensation (Chermak 1992: 167). During
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the 1970s and 1980s, political risk studies became more abundant and the associated body
of literature began to grow. This section analyses the political risk literature and some of
the assessment methodologies available, pointing out relative strengths and weaknesses.
- 2.3.1 Subjective Methods
These assessment approaches are based on the subjective views of people believed to be
experts in the potential market and the various factors that affect political risk. They range
from informal decision assistance, such as grand tours and "old hands" assessments, to
structured approaches, such as the Delphi technique, comprehensive qualitative
assessments, Bayesian methods and expert rnodels+'. Regardless of how they are
implemented, these approaches are all based upon the subjective impressions of one or
more individuals. The most immediate shortcoming of such methods is the dependence on
the knowledge of an "expert", who may be completely unqualified for the task entrusted to
him or her.
Firms sometimes make use of informal decision assistance in their political risk analysis.
They send key executives on grand tours of the potential host country to develop a
firsthand opinion of the risk environment, employ "old hands" (employees or outside
consultants who have had experience working or investing in the country) to provide
political risk advice, or rely on the knowledge and impressions of key decision makers
within the firm's executive.
Such approaches are likely to result in inaccurate, incomplete and biased assessments of
risk. Simon (1985: 137) argues that the key to understanding such methods lies in the
examination of the underlying power structures and personality dynamics within the
management hierarchy of the multinational. Although intermediate and lower-level
managers may provide a sheaf of research papers and financial analysis statements, the
ultimate decision to invest in or disinvest from a host country usually rests with one or two
senior corporate executives.
The impressions of these individuals of the host country, its government, its economy and
its social and cultural characteristics can overturn months of careful research by others
17 For an overview of these approaches, sec Simon (1985), Chermak (1992), and Frci & Ruloff (198
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within the corporation. Stereotypes of foreign societies begin to playa decisive role, as do
internal power politics within the company.
The Iranian revolution of 1978 serves to illustrate how impressionistic assessments can
distort the perception of risk (Simon 1985:137). Prior to the revolution, the pro-Western
stance of the Iranian shah, the country's military strength vis-a-vis its neighbours and the
large-scale internal military apparatus designed to quell any internal dissension led many
CEOs to expect a continuing stable environment within the country. Foreign investment
was actively encouraged and enthusiastically undertaken.
Iran's friendliness towards the West allowed Western executives to define the situation in
terms of their ideological and political preferences. When internal unrest erupted, the large
amount of capital invested in the form of factory plants, projects, and subsidiaries resulted
in a natural reluctance for multinationals to admit the gravity of the situation. Wanting to
believe that the condition was manageable, executives tended to interpret subsequent
events from the same perspectives that originally encouraged investment and tough
disinvestment decisions were delayed with disastrous results. When top executives make
unstructured and impressionistic "analyses" of the risk environment in host countries, the
resulting decisions are vulnerable to their own political and ideological biases.
For these reasons, impressionistic methods are no longer widely employed in their original
form. New methods have been developed to contribute structure to opinion based risk
analyses and to allay the influence of stereotypes and selective perceptions. The Delphi
technique (Simon 1985: 140; Chermak 1992: 173) uses structured interviews of country
experts to formally elicit and interpret their opinions of risk. It is believed that because
more experts are approached and because a formalized interview process is used, results
are less biased, more objective and more readily compared across countries and across
timeframes.
The technique attempts to distil the views of the participants to anive at an informed risk
consensus, progressing through a series of interview rounds, each time feeding the
responses of the previous round back to the group for re-evaluation. The experts are
questioned individually so that a certain level of anonymity can be maintained. The results
of these private interviews are returned to the group for discussion and critique, without the
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identity of the authors of particular views being disclosed. In this way it is believed that
debate can be maintained while still moving towards a consensus.
The Delphi technique takes advantage of each expert's knowledge and experience and
allows each expert to defend his or her perspective should it deviate from the norm, yet
presents the danger that group consensus can be forced rather than arrived at (Simon
1985: 140). As the objective of the Delphi technique is to achieve a group position and
since each expert is aware of where he or she stands relative to the group, there is constant
pressure for a "dissenter" to bring his or her views into line with the norm. This could lead
to a form of intimidation and distorted results. Furthermore, the role of facilitator is also
particularly important, as it is this person's job to coordinate the views obtained in the
private interview sessions. By emphasizing or deemphasizing certain views, he or she can
shift and manipulate the process, whether unwittingly or not.
Comprehensive qualitative assessments can be used to good effect in analyzing the risk
environment of the firm. Such methods produce a detailed, qualitative analytical evaluation
of the potential investment, and their explanatory nature ensures that the sources of risk can
be well understood. Within the corporation, different individuals from different
departments or subsidiaries can produce a multitude of reports that cover many functional
areas. Legal departments, financial officers and dedicated political analysts can combine to
produce a body of work that encompasses the various spheres of risk.
While comprehensive, such approaches do present problems. The first is that there may be
an overflow of information that could make decision-making difficult. Secondly, if a
number of individuals are involved in the process, it is conceivable that structure and
consistency across the reports may not be maintained (Simon 1985:137). Lastly, each
participant may overemphasize his or her area of expertise, adding hidden distortions that
may detract from the accuracy of the method.
Despite these concerns, qualitative assessments contain a significant advantage that should
not be understated. They allow the nuances and specificities of the individual risk problem
at hand to be highlighted and reported upon. Such methods, with their focus on describing
the entirety of the risk environment, must perforce create a made-to-measure assessment
that may well be far deeper and, in that respect, superior to any effort towards systematic
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quantification. For this reason, such methods should not be abandoned, but rather included
as a corollary element in any risk assessment study (Frei & Ruloff 1987:6).
Structure can be added and bias reduced by adding probability estimates to qualitative
assessments. Known as the Bayesian method, this approach works from the assumption
that human judgment can be a valuable asset in forecasting events and attempts to
incorporate personal hunches and convictions in a systematic way (Whitford 2003:909)18.
The analyst assigns a probabilistic weight to the likelihood of an event occurring. He or she
then refines this probability when new information becomes available. This allows his or
her subjective judgment of the risk situation to be incorporated into the analysis in a
systematic way, and forces the analyst to take cognizance of his or her preconceived ideas
of the risk environment.
A model can also be used to inject structure into an expert generated assessment'". Risk
assessment services regularly make use of such models and some that have been created
are the BERI (Business Environmental Risk Index), the World Political Risk Forecast and
PO LICON (Chermak 1992: 173). The BERI, for example, consists of 15 weighted variables
believed to be related to political risk. A panel of experts taken from the US and the
country being assessed are requested individually to rate the country in terms of each
variable. The results are tabulated and the mean response of the group is fed back to each
expert. Adjustments to individual scores are then allowed, an average for each variable is
calculated and an index out of a 100 created. Scores closest to 100 correspond to the lower
possible political risk.
The benefit of using a model is that it forces the expert or experts to judge the country in a
structured way according to predefined variables. This allows for the expert's opinion to be
"quantified" and for the results of the assessment to be compared across countries and
timeframes.
18 For an example of a study of political risk that uses the Bayesian method, see Clark & Tunaru (2003). For a text on the
use of Bayesian inference and computing in general social science studies, sec Gill (2002).
19 Sec Alon & Marrin (1998) for an example of a normative, structured model that puqJorts to assess risk. The model
considers governmcnr-, society- and economic-related factors for borh external and internal dimensions. Values arc
assigned to a range of variables in each category according to an expert's assessment.
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2.3.1.1 Discussing Subjective Methods
There are a number of problems with risk approaches based on expert opinions. The first is
that the lack of empirical and statistical testing of the factors used implies possible
subjectivity (Chermak 1992: 174, Frei & Ruloff 1987:7). The second is that personal
opinion allows for greater bias, although as more opinions are sought, prejudice should be
reduced. It cannot, however, be eliminated. The third problem is that the results of such
systems are relative and are therefore only meaningful when considered in the context of
other rankings. This means that they cannot easily be incorporated into economic analysis.
Although attempts to construct formal methodologies for expert analysis have been made, a
fourth problem is that the implied mathematical rigour and precision behind the resultant
ratings can be misleading. Consider the "quantified" ratings of an assessment model. The
numerical value associated with the assessment hides the truth that the result is only a
formalised combination of subjective views and is not necessarily accurate. This can
present a danger in itself - the findings of risk assessment services may be overrated
because of the implied mathematical rigour. Furthermore, expert selection is also seldom
transparent to the end user of the assessment - the qualifications of the person making the
judgment may not be particularly noteworthy (Frei & Ruloff 1987:7).
A fifth problem is that experts' methods may not be sufficiently complex to do justice to
the political risk environment of the country in question. In fact, the results of a study
published by Bilanz (1983 in Frei & Ruloff 1987:7) support this view. Statistical analysis
of ratings delivered for 72 countries by four risk assessment services (BERI, World
Political Forecast, Institutional Investor, and NSE Consultants) revealed that close to 50 per
cent of variance observed across the risk ratings could be explained by a variable as simple
as the per capita gross national product (GNP) of the countries in question.
This indicates that experts implicitly equate underdevelopment and risk, using per capita
GNP (the most common indicator of development) as a proxy for risk. This finding clearly
demonstrating the dangers of biased views: the conclusion of such experts would be that
less developed countries would automatically be riskier investment options, regardless of
the type of investment or the sector it is intended for - a view that is not necessarily true.
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Even in thorough, well-documented assessments, it is conceivable that such bias may have
an unwanted impact.
Finally, the last paragraph hints at another critique of the expert opinion led assessment -
ethnocentricity. When the experts conducting the assessment are sourced largely from the
developed West, the group itself, the facilitators and the decision makers may all exhibit
the same form of cultural and ethnic prejudice. A large panel of experts and structured
analysis methods may not be sufficient to combat this bias. This may result in an overstated
risk assessment and the foreclosure of possibly lucrative investment opportunities, or even
the understatement of risk due to shared ideology and stereotypes, as demonstrated by the
Iranian revolution of 1978.
2.3.2 Objective Methods
Objective assessments rely on measurable variables to develop a view of risk through
various mathematical or econometric processes. The variables used are typically financial
and economic in nature as these lend themselves well to analysis.
The banking industry, for example, uses objective measures to assess country risk which,
according to Levinsohn (2002:40), can be considered a broad category that includes
political risk. He maintains that country risk can be assessed by considering a combination
of economic, financial, geopolitical, sociological and historical factors and that country risk
analysis and forecasting techniques can be used to identify political risks themselves'",
Country risk assessments focus on the ability of the country to meet its foreign debt
repayments, as this is the area of most interest to the bank. Unlike a company with a direct
investment in the country, banks are relatively unconcerned about the danger of asset
expropriation or the passing of laws that limit profit repatriation. The nature of their
business allows them to narrow the range of their assessment and to make use of "hard"
economic data augmented with broad and subjective overviews of political risk.
20 Sec l larrns (2002) for an example of the usc of country risk measures, in the form of the International Country Risk
Guide's ratings, as a proxy measure for political risk.
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2.3.2.1 Discussing Objective Measures
There are obvious problems with such approaches. Firstly, whereas economic variables
lend themselves easily to quantitative expression, political variables do not. Data on a
country's GOP, debt service ratio, inflation figures, unemployment and the like are readily
available through various publications and are apt inputs to rigorous analysis. Political
variables cannot be measured as easily and numbers that are associated with them are often
based on subjective ratings given by individuals (discussed abover".
As a result, political factors may be underestimated because they are not as easily
measurable as economic factors (Simon 1985: 142). There may also be an overemphasis on
the political factors that can be measured in an objective fashion because these can easily
be incorporated into the assessment while the impact of those that cannot easily be
measured may be understated or ignored. To compound the issue, economic variables are,
to some extent, used as proxies for political variables - a distortion that results in
misleading analyses.
Furthermore, it can be argued that there is a certain degree of subjectivity in the selection of
the variables that will be used in the objective assessment. If this subjectivity is ignored, a
hidden bias may be produced that will confuse the analysis. Western views of risk may
emphasise certain economic factors over others, yet these factors may not be as important
in the context of the country being analysed.
A high incidence of acts of corruption in a country, for example, may lead to the conclusion
that the country is high risk, yet the "corruption" observed may be institutionalized and part
of the business "culture" of the country concerned. In some cases, the corruption could
even be formalized, tolerated and predictable. It would therefore be less of a threat to
foreign investors than its objective measure would have anticipated. This would make
comparing assessments that include corruption as a political variable difficult because the
corruption value would have to be adjusted to suit each country. Such adjustments would
21 Consider variables mentioned by I .conard such as the degree of ethnic fracrionalisation, government legitimacy and the
presence of an organised opposition (2001 :493). These variables arc difficult to operationalise. How does one measure
the prescnce of an organised opposition? The measurc would depend heavily on the definition of organised and would
probably incorporate some degree of inrcrprcrarion. This in turn implies that it is not a truc objective measure and this
inherent subjectivity, unless carefully explained, may remain hidden. As Leonard warns, some models used by rating
agencies, various US government departments and country risk publications include ongoing biases towards different
regimes (2001 :493).
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have to be performed on a subjective basis by a country expert, implying that the measure
is no longer objective.
To summarise: so-called objective approaches to political risk assessment, such as country
risk ratings, are not well suited to companies that intend to invest or have invested directly
in a foreign country. Political variables cannot be as easily measured as economic variables
and their measurement and selection often include a certain level of subjectivity that may
lead them to be incorrectly interpreted if not adequately explained. They do not encompass
the full milieu of political risk, providing a broad overview at best. A more thorough
understanding of the sources and influences of risk is preferable.
2.3.3 The Meta-Discipline of Political Risk
Continuing alongside the actual practice of creating political risk assessments is a meta-
discipline that attempts to test the methodology of the creation of risk models to establish
objective criteria and explicit procedures through which to understand political phenomena
(Simon 1985: 143). Such studies are usually undertaken by academics, and employ cross-
national quantitative political analysis.
One of the lasting criticisms of typical approaches to political risk assessment was that
most studies were conducted on a case by case basis, making comparison across countries
and across timeframes difficult. Cross-national quantitative analysis attempted to correct
this by producing a body of research that could identify and define perpetual factors of
political risk, thereby allowing objective and generalized models to be created. This newer
area of the political risk discipline is the focus of much of the modem state of the art.
These forms of analyses derive objective measures of political conditions from secondary
sources of information, such as international yearbooks containing country profiles. From
these profiles, factors such as the type of political system, the number and strength of the
opposition, the composition of ethnic-religious groups, international alliance commitments
and so forth are garnered and compared across countries and against measures of political
risk. This allows an empirical testing of the various theories and methodologies of risk
assessment, generating a collection of adjacent research that can support or disprove the
various approaches to risk assessment. New theories and hypotheses about risk can be
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tested in a comprehensive and structured way, using a reservoir of country data that was not
available during the 1960s and 1970s.
Broad and general in scope, these methods cannot be directly applied to the specific needs
of international investors. This having been said, their findings do have bearing on the
methodologies of risk assessment employed by MNCs.
A leading criticism against quantitative methods of risk assessment (listed above under
"objective" measures, and not to be confused with the meta-discipline of cross-national
analysis) is that they are incapable of including certain important conceptual variables, and
this deficiency retards their predictive value. Stevens (1997) addresses this problem in an
evaluation of the statistical interrelationships between market and economic variables and
foreign direct investment. Using both correlation and regression analysis, he compares the
levels of foreign direct investment (the dependent variable) in nine lower to middle income
countries against a selection of common indicators (independent variables) used to develop
quantitative political risk indexes, namely, gross domestic product, balance of payment
equilibrium, external debt, debt service, private interest rate and official interest rate.
If the quantitative approach to a political risk rating scheme were reliable, Stevens
hypothesizes, the results of the statistical analysis would reveal a proportional relationship
between the dependent and independent variables for the majority of the countries in the
study. In other words, the political risk indicators used would have a similar relationship
with the level of FDI in each of the countries under inspection. His results do not, however,
reflect this. Only a few of the variables show high correlations in a few of the countries,
and the same variables show low correlations in the majority of the countries.
Stevens concludes that the "quantitative approaches to political risk analysis almost all
suffer from being unable to distinguish the different risks of different industries; they
measure only the risk of the country" (Stevens 1997:83). Quantitative methodologies tend
to be less meaningful to micro-risk assessments than to macro-risk assessments and are
therefore in danger of obscuring potentially lucrative business opportunities.
The study suffers from a fairly common problem encountered when attempting to assess
the various risk methodologies: how does one operationalise political risk? Stevens has
used FDI as a proxy for political risk, implicitly assuming that the greater the level of
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foreign investment in a particular country, the lower the level of risk associated with that
country. Such an assumption involves circular reasoning: foreign investment is based upon
perceptions of political risk and therefore cannot be used as an accurate indicator of the
_level of risk itself. FDI, therefore, is only an indication of the collective perception of
political risk amongst investors, and does not indicate the actual degree of political risk in
the country. This is a fitting illustration of a point made earlier: quantitative methods (both
cross-national theory testing and actual quantitative risk assessments) can produce spurious
results and, what is worse, inspire false confidence in those results because of implied
mathematical rigour.
2.3.4 A New Approach to Political Risk Analysis
Henisz (2000, 2002) and Henisz and ZeIner (1999) suggest a fresh approach to the problem
of predicting risk. This method attempts to shift the traditional emphasis on
macroeconomic accounting and subjective risk ratings to an analysis of the structure of the
political regime, the consequent credibility of policy makers' commitment to a given policy
regime, the likely extent of lobbying by affected consumer groups and the affect that this
lobbying will have on the operations of the investor". They advocate the
"[development} of a richer understanding of the links between the
structure of a nation's political institutions, the preferences of the political
actors that inhabit them, the level of political organisation of relevant
interest groups, and most importantly the manner in which these forces
interact to determine the stability of the policy environment and the likely
direction of any changes in that environment" (Henisz and Zelner 1999:4).
22 I IanTIS (2002) argues congruently to l lcnisz and Zeiner, postulating that political risk can be explained by group politics
and that a state's policy preferences are determined by the ability of different groups to influence policymakers.
According to l larrns, favourable policies are the result of the influence of actors benefiting from international
investments and their interest in supporting ongoing liberalisarion. I los rile policies are the outcome of the influence of
marginalised actors left out of the process who are determined to secure a share of the benefits for themselves (Leonard
2001 :496).
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By taking this approach, Henisz and ZeIner hope to create a methodology that is more
prospective in nature, rather than based on observations of the past behaviour of
policymakers. Their focus is on the political and other aims of the various players in the
industry and how capable they are of achieving those aims given the structure of the
political institutions within which they operate.
To this end, Henisz constructs an index of political constraints with the explicit goal of
measuring the likelihood of changes in the policy regime and the resulting stability or
credibility of the policy environment (Henisz 2000: 1-4)23. The measure is based upon the
number of independent veto points that exist within a country's political system and is
derived from a spatial model of political interaction among branches of government". The
index uses data on the number of independent branches with veto power and on the
distribution of political preferences across and within these branches. In addition to the
executive branch, it considers the legislative, judicial, and sub-federal branches.Y
Multiple independent branches of government with veto power over policy outcomes have
important ramifications for a country's commitment to an existing policy environment:
they restrict the discretion of policymakers to make policy changes. In order to change the
2) Studies of the credibility and stability of the policy environment were originally based on subjective indexes derived from
the opinions of local businesspeople or country experts (see Borner, Brunetti, and Weder (1995) and Knack and Keefer
(1995)). '!'he shortcomings of these approaches are that they lack historical consistency, the link between the expert
opinions and the political institutions is unknown and the results are not easily generalisable to or comparable with other
countries (l lcnisz 2001 :5). It is these problems that prompted l Icnisz to develop his objective measure of policy
credibility.
24 Veto players are defined as individual or collective decision makers whose agreemenr is required before the status quo
can be changed. The theory of veto players was originally developed to act as an analytical tool for all types of political
system, regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (onc-, rwo-, or multi-party), and type of
parliament (unicameral or multicameral) (Tscbclis 2000:441-442). Political systems differ widely across numerous
dimensions. In order to come to terms with these dimensions, theorists had constructed numerous typologies and
classifications that, according to Tsebclis, were incomparable and had resulted in confusion and parallel debate. Tscbclis'
idea was to begin from the final policy outcome of any political game. Working backwards from there, he rationalised
that if different characteristics of political systems are important, it is because of the effect that they have on policy
outcomes. In order for a departure to be made from the status quo policy, a certain number of actors within the ysrern
had to agree to the ringing of the change. This need for a!,'1'eemenr, Tscbclis argues, is typical of every system, yet it is the
number and nature of the players who must agree that differs from institution to institution. By wa)' of example: in order
to change legislation in Greece, parliament (collective player) has to vote a new law. Contrast this with rhe same task in
the US. There the I louse, the Senate and the President (two collective players and one individual player) have to agree
before the law can be passed. Tscbclis's work identifies veto players in different political systems and generates
expectations regarding particular combinations of institutional characteristics.
25 lor data on the existence of unicameral and bicameral legislatures, as well as sub-federal units with substantive veto
power, I Icnisz relics on the Polity database (available at hn:p:!lbsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscrlpolity/index.htm). Both the
leRG (available from Political Risk Sen;ices) and Polity databases were used for information on the independence of the
judiciary. Data on the party composition of the legislatures comes from various is .ues of Tl» Political Handboole of tb«
World and The SlatemGII's Yearbook.
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status quo, the political actors need to propose and sell an alternative policy to each of the
independent branches with veto power.
Assumptions are made to simplify the preferences of the actors in these institutions so that
- a first-stage measure of the viability of policy change can be developed based solely on the
number of veto points'". This initial measure is then refined with the addition of data
reflecting the alignment of preferences across the various veto points, derived from the
party composition of executive and legislative branches of government, and the
appointment history of the judicial system. The index is tempered with further data to
reflect the heterogeneity within the various legislative branches, which increases
(decreases) the decision costs involved in overturning policy for aligned (opposed)
government branches (Henisz & Zeiner 1999: 13)
The distribution of political preferences is important because, if the preferences of the
legislature were perfectly aligned with those of the executive, the existence of an
independent legislature would not restrict the discretion of the executive in any way. The
larger the number of independent veto points and the farther the preferences of these
branches from those of the executive, the greater the constraints on the ability of the
policymakers to modify regulatory policy, tax policy, or other relevant policies.
26 The political consrrainrs index is limited by irs assumptions. Nevertheless, Ilenisz defends ir thus: "[wjhile [rhc index is
based on], admittedly, strong assumptions, rhc incorporation of more refined and realistic game structures and
preference distributions presents severe complications for analytic tractability. It is hoped that ... the strength of the
results obtained using the simple framework presented here will provide an impetus for future research" (2002).
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The computed index is normalised so that all values fall between 1 and O. A higher number
indicates a greater level of political constraint. Drelichman sums it up concisel y:
" ... the [index] can be interpreted as the probability that a proposal taken
from random from the executive's sphere of interest doesn't fall within the
range of acceptable policies of one of the veto holding powers. The index
takes into account the degree of alignment of the veto holding players with
the executive. Clearly, more veto points imply a larger value for the [index],
while a larger degree of alignment of a veto point reduces the value of the
index" (2000:4).
2.3.4.1 Discussing the Political Constraints Index
Henisz uses his political constraints index to predict the commitment that a government
will have to a particular policy. His hypothesis is that institutions with more checks and
balances will reduce volatility in the policy regime by limiting the ability of political actors
to pursue short-run political or social objectives that favour one group over another (Henisz
2001 :7). Where multiple independent veto points exist, biased actions are more likely to be
exposed in public debate or successfully opposed within the political institution by another
actor representing the disadvantaged group.
Using cross-national data on fiscal policy drawn from 172 countries over periods up to 39
years (1960-1998), Henisz finds that the countries that ranked higher on the political
constraints index have lower levels of policy volatility for capital expenditures, non-
revenue, taxes on capital, lower volatility in goods and services expenditures, and lower
volatility in subsidies (2001: 14-17). These results indicate that the index does reflect
commitment to a specific policy regime.
In another study, Zeiner and Henisz (2000) demonstrate that the levels of political
constraints and of political competition within the industry also influence the quantity of
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investment and hence of political risk27. They empirically show that investors prefer
countries with higher political constraints when there is significant political competition,
because the likelihood of political competitors (industrialists, agriculturalists, producers or
_ other significant actors) being able to lobby successfully for policies that will advantage
themselves over the investor is diminished.
On the other hand, lower levels of political constraints are preferred when political
competition is weak, because then the decreased opposition faced by the investor will make
him or her more able to agitate for changes that act in his or her favour and reduced
constraints will make the likelihood of advantageous policy change greater. The tacit
implication is that higher levels of political constraints combined with high levels of
political competition lead to lower levels of political risk and are therefore more favourable
for investment.
This form of analysis represents a move away from the traditional political risk assessment
with its focus on security and stability studies or country risk modelling. Viewing political
risk as a normal policy outcome adds significant explanatory power and provides ex ante
insight into the likelihood of hostile policies being adopted (Leonard 2001 :496). Analysts
are able to monitor the relative influence of different groups and their attitude towards
foreign investments, certain industries, or even companies, allowing scope for risk to be
assessed at a micro level rather than concentrating on systemic factors that may have little
bearing on specific instances of political risk.
Returning to the definition of political risk presented earlier, it now becomes apparent how
a definition that includes more sources of political risk can be accommodated. The PCI,
with its focus on policy outcomes, includes the various influences that actors in the
different environments have on the government. Some of these influences are explicitly
part of the computation of the index, such as those of the judiciary and sub-federal bodies.
Others are implied. Consider, for example, the lobby actions of competitors in the business
environments. These are implicitly included in the index because successful lobbying will
27 The authors do nor use the term "political risk" in this particular study, electing rather to discuss the level of in csrrnenr
in the electricity senor. Llscwhcrc (1lcnisz and Zeiner 1999), they present evidence that they believe demonstrates the
existence of a direct relationship between the level of infrastructure investment in a country and the level of political risk,
alJowing the assumption to be made that, for them, investment is an indicator of political risk itself.
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affect the preferences of explicit role players, such as politicians of the upper or lower
house.
The PCI, therefore, neatly incorporates the various influences on policy making. The
-manner through which policy affects the business environment and the firm must be
explored through an analysis of the political economy of the sector of interest.
Investors in the electricity sector in India, it will be shown, are faced by a large degree of
political competition from, amongst others, agriculturalists, consumer unions, labour,
environmentalist lobbies and even political parties. India, too, registers relatively highly on
the political constraints index in question. The findings of ZeIner and Henisz (2000) would
predict that the Indian electricity sector would be a preferred destination for investment,
given the huge market potential and the stated intentions of the government to attract
foreign participation. Yet investors have increasingly shied clear. Thus far, it would seem,
for good reason28.
Consider once more the definition of political risk: it is a measure of the probability of
change in the operational environment of the firm as a result of the political process. In
certain circumstances, the absence of the possibility of change predicted by a low risk
rating may be detrimental to the firm if that change is necessary to protect the firm's
profits.
This assignment, therefore, suggests an alternative interpretation for the index of political
constraints. If more veto points and non-aligned political preferences make it more difficult
to change pol icy, it follows that the index of political constraints is also a measure of status-
quo bias. When reform of economic institutions, particularly politically important ones, is
required, a strong status-quo bias will tend to work against change. Thus a disabling initial
policy environment will tend to be propagated. From this perspective, it would seem that
political constraints tend to prohibit positive policy change, thereby increasing or
propagating the possibility of the loss of the operation's profits.
28 Sec the discussion on economic reform in the electricity senor below.
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2.4 Conclusion
Although private investment in infrastructure has grown significantly since the beginning
pf the nineties, infrastructure investors are still subject to potentially damaging political
risks. After direct investment has occurred, the investor suffers a rapid alteration in
bargaining power, allowing the host government more leeway to renegotiate the original
terms of investment. Modem trends towards democratisation and the characteristics of
infrastructure investment increase the incentive for sovereign governments to behave
opportunistically. These arguments help to explain the existence of political risk in
infrastructure projects and indicate why political risk assessment is an important
component of the investment decision.
Various methods of assessing political risk have been developed and used since the
inception of the discipline, although each has relevant strengths and weaknesses. Recently,
a new approach has been suggested that is based on an index of policy constraints that
attempts to measure the ability for political groupings to influence policymaking.
It will be argued beneath that it is only with an understanding of the initial policy regime
that the political constraints index in question becomes useful. The next section of this
assignment will discuss the Indian policy environment, the state of reform in the economy
and the current issues faced by the electricity sector, before comparing the constraints index
for India with occurrences in the policy regime. From this comparison it will be shown that
the predictions of the index remain true, though the policy stability it predicts may not be
beneficial to the investor.
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3 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INDIAN
ELECTRICITY SECTOR
3.1 Introduction
The economic reforms that took place in India from 1991 were part of a seismic shift that
moved the focus of Indian economics from state-led growth towards an open, externally
oriented and market dominated economy. The reforms were a swift departure, both in
policy and in intent, from the economic stance of the previous 40 years.
To understand this swing in Indian economic thinking, it is useful to consider both the
actors in the political economy and the exogenous and endogenous factors that have
influenced the reform process since its inception in the nineties. This chapter begins by
briefly describing the federal structure of India, its bicameral legislature, the political
dynamic that underlies the interaction between the federal and state governments and the
country's primary political groupings. Such background information sets the scene for the
discussion of the political economy of reform to follow.
The chapter then charts the progress of general economic reform in India, considering
internal and external economic and internal political factors that have helped to keep the
1991 reforms on track. It assesses the general pace of reform and embarks on a focused
discussion of reform under the incumbent Indian government (led by the Bharatiya Janata
Party), highlighting how political opposition from within and without the party has
complicated the reform process and slowed its progress. What is also noted is the large
number of opportunistic actors in the Indian political sphere and their impact on the ability
of incumbents to effect change.
Lastly, Chapter 3 focuses its attention on the state of the Indian Electricity Sector and the
need for sustainable reform. It considers the problems left behind by the state-led
development schemes of the past, the reforms that have been attempted since 1991, the
disastrous Enron affair, opposition to tariff restructuring and the newly passed Electricity
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Bill. The story of the halting progress of reform in the electricity sector provides material
for the assessment of the Political Constraints Index to follow.
3.2 The Political Profile of India
3.2.1 Overview
India, a "Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic", is a union of states with a
Parliamentary system of Government'". The multi-ethnic and multi-religious federal
republic is comprised of 29 states and 6 union territories, with its capital situated in New
Delhi. The country has a bicameral parliament, including the indirectly-elected Upper
House, or Rajya Sabha (government assembly) and the directly-elected Lower House, or
Lok Sabha (people's assembly). The Judiciary is largely independent and the legal system
is a derivative of English common law.
The country's basis for governance is its Constitution, which was adopted by Constituent
Assembly on the 26th of November 1949, and enforced on the 26th of January 1950. The
Constitution governs the sharing of legislative power between Parliament and the State
Legislatures, and provides for the vesting of residual powers in Parliament. The power to
amend the Constitution also vests in Parliament.
3.2.2 The Union Government
The Union Executive consists of the President, the Vice President and the Council of
Ministers, which is led by the Prime Minister to aid and advise the President.
3.2.2.1 President
The President is elected by members of an electoral college consisting of elected members
of both the House of Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies of the states, with votes
suitably weighted. The Presidential term of office is five years.
29 The following resources were used to compile this summary of the I ndian political structure and important political
groupings: l-conornist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Report (2003:4), fndian I':mbassy (2003) and Sridharan (2002:55-
76)
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Among other powers, the President can proclaim a state of emergency in the country if it is
believed that the country's security or that of any of its territories is threatened by war,
external aggression, or armed rebellion. At the event of the constitutional machinery of the
state failing, the President can confer any or all of the functions of government upon him or
herself.
3.2.2.2 Vice-President
The Vice-President is elected in a similar fashion to the President and also holds office for
five years. The Vice-President is Ex-officio Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (see below).
3.2.2.3 Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers, comprised of Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of States, and Deputy
Ministers, is the body responsible for issues relating to the administration of the affairs of
the Union and for legislative proposals. It is the function of the Prime Minister to
communicate all decisions made by the Council to the President. Generally, each
department has an officer designated as Secretary to the Government of India to advise
Ministers on policy matters and general administration. The Cabinet Secretariat has an
important coordinating role in decision making at the highest level and operates under the
direction of the Prime Minister.
The Legislative of the Union, called Parliament, consists of the President, Rajya Sabha
(Upper House) and Lok Sabha (Lower House). All legislation requires the consent of both
houses of parliament. However, in the case of money bills, the will of the Lok Sabha
prevails.
3.2.2.4 Rajya Sabha
The Rajya Sabha consists of 245 members. Of these, 233 represent states and uruon
territories and 12 members are nominated by the President. Elections to the Rajya Sabha
are indirect; members are elected by the elected members of Legislative Assemblies of the
concerned states. It is not subject to dissolution; one third of its members retire every
second year.
41
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.2.2.5 Lok Sabha
The Lok Sabha is composed of representatives of the people chosen by direct election on
the basis of universal adult suffrage. Currently, the Lok Sabha consists of 545 members
with 2 members nominated by the President to represent the Anglo-Indian Community.
- Unless dissolved under unusual circumstances, the term of the Lok Sabha is five years.
3.2.2.6 State Governments
Each state has its own government that operates according to a system closely resembling
the Union's government system.
3.2.2.7 The Political Dynamic
Thirty years ago, state politics in India consisted of coalition governments of convenience
collapsing with alarming rapidity, forcing frequent elections. Parties seldom featured for
long periods on the political scene. More recently, states have shown remarkable patterns
of stability. The trend has been for more and more state governments to complete their full
five-year terms. Moreover, the states have weathered not only the era of their own chaotic
politics but also efforts to centralize power in New Delhi; India has moved toward a more
genuine federal system. Chief Ministers now actively compete with each other - and with
New Delhi - for investment from India and abroad (Sridharan 2002:66-67).
Many states now have two-party (or stable two-coalition) or three-party systems. The
dynamics of state politics and its relationship to political dynamics in New Delhi play an
important role in deciding which parties form coalitions and with whom: the pattern of
opposition in the state determines what alliances are possible for the national election.
Personal rivalries of party leaders also play an important part in coalition formation
(Sridharan 2002:65-68)30.
This dynamic has led to the shifting of power to the state governments and regional parties,
making national coordination on macro policy increasingly difficult. As will be elaborated
beneath further, fiscal con sol idation in general and subsidy reduction in particular are
30 Sridharan (2002) provides an articulate discussion of the trends and transformations in India politics during the nineties,
particularly rhc eclipse of rhc one-parry dominanr sysrem rhar typified post-independence India and the advent of what
he calls the "era of coalition politics".
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hampered when the national government relies on the support of powerful regional parties
with parochial allegiances to interest lobbies (Bardhan 2003 :6).
3.2.3 Important Political Parties and Groupings
3.2.3.1 The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
The BJP, originally founded in an earlier incarnation as the Bharatiya Jan Sangh in 1951,
leads the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The party is considered to be
"Hindu nationalist" and is the political wing of a group of interconnected cultural and
religious movements - the Sangh Parivar - of which the most politically significant is the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) (Economist 2002). The BJP's attractiveness and
strength have come from its reputation, somewhat sullied in recent years, for integrity and
party discipline. It is one of the two parties in the country that has both national reach and
national ambitions.
The BJP first emerged as a significant force in the 1989 general election, winning 88 seats
on the back of a religious issue - the construction of a Hindu temple in Ayodhya, Uttar
Pradesh. In the 1991 election, the BJP took four states and became the national opposition.
Its first national government was formed in May 1996, led by the current Prime Minister,
Atal Bihari Vajpayee. It lasted 13 days. In 1998, the party won 182 seats and constructed a
coalition of 13 patties, which collapsed in April 1999. In September of that year, the BJP
led the National Democratic Alliance to a clear majority 297 parliamentary seats in
response to the Congress party's 134. The remaining 106 seats were taken by non-aligned
parties. Vajpayee was elected unanimously as the new Prime Minister and seemed set to
rule with a strong mandate. At the time of rising to power, Vajpayee was confident that his
government would be able to supply India with electoral stability, something that was
needed considering that the country had had six governments since 1996. Recently,
however, the coalition has threatened to crumble, putting that promise in jeopardy.
The BJP's strongest ally is Shiv Sena (SHS), which began in the 1960s as a "sons of the
soil" party in Bombay targeting immigrants to the city. It has since become virulently
Hindu nationalist. Other allies include the Samata Party (SAP), led by George Fernandes,
the Defense Minister, whose strength lies almost entirely in the state of Bihar. It has a
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"socialist" ideology, and has joined with two like-minded parties, the Lok Shakti, (LS) of
the Commerce Minister, Rama Krishna Hegde, a party confined to Karnataka, and the
lanata Dal [United] segment of the Janat Dal (JD).
Other BlP allies from the 1998 election include the Asom Gana Parish ad (AGP), a "sons of
- the soil" Assam-based party; the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), the Sikh party in Punjab,
where it is the governing patty and the West Bengal Trinamool Congress (WBTC).
In the 1999 election the BlP was also allied with the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK),
the ruling party in Tamil Nadu, a "cultural nationalist" party, originally separatist and with
an anti-Brahmin ideology, and with the recently installed governing party of Haryana, the
Indian National Lok Dal (INLD).
3.2.3.2 Indian National Congress (INC)
The Indian National Congress (INC) ruled India at the national level for 45 of the 54 years
since independence. The party's major uncertainty is its continuing reliance for leadership
on the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, now represented by Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born widow of
former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Although she displayed greater self-assurance and
more fluent Hindi on the 2002 campaign trail than during her previous campaigns, her
foreign birth could remain an electoral problem. Still, voter reaction to the BlP's record
may well overshadow these concerns.
The patty currently has far fewer allies than the B1P. The only alliance that could be termed
stable is with the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the state of Kerala. The Congress is
the inheritor of the Congress movement that brought India independence. It has split many
times since 1977 and remains a "catch-all" party accommodating a broad range of
ideological and ethnic elements. Its strength is spread over the entire country. Its present
allies of convenience include the RJD (Rashtriya lanata Dal), and the ADMK (Anna
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) led by layalalitha in Tamil Nadu.
3.2.3.3 The "Third Front"
The "Third Front" is not an alliance, but the parties in it share a "secular" and "socialist"
ideology, although differing considerably in their origins and social base. The Communist
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Party of India [Marxist] (CPM), led by the octogenarian chief minister of Bengal, Jyoti
Basu, is the "left-wing" Communist Party; it has partners in Bengal's ruling Left Front
(LF), which includes the Communist Party of India (CPI), now a shadow of its former self.
The CPM is also the major partner in the ruling Left Democratic Front (LDF) in Kerala and
_ governs in the small state of Tripura. The Samajwadi Party (SP) is largely confined to Uttar
Pradesh; its leader is Mulayam Singh Yadav, Defence Minister in the 1996-98 United
Front Government. The TMC (Tamil Maanila Congress) split from the Congress in Tamil
Nadu in 1996 and won overwhelmingly in partnership with the DMK, but lost badly to the
ADMK-BIP alliance in 1998. The NCP (National Congress Party) is only three months
old. It is led by Sharad Pawar, a former chief minister of Maharashtra and its strength is
almost entirely in that state.
In a class by itself is the BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party) led by Kanshi Ram. Largely confined
to Uttar Pradesh, it has succeeded in mobilizing the support of the dalits and other
"underclass" social groups, and it speaks of "equal justice"; its ideology, however, is
secondary to its willingness to bargain with the other parties for benefits for its
constituency.
Some of the Third Front parties once had some national presence, but most wield serious
power in only one or a handful of states. This includes the CPM, which is a serious
presence only in West Bengal, Kerala, and Tripura.
In general, Congress and Janata Dal are considered to be centrist parties while BIP is
termed a rightist party and CPI and CPM are leftist parties. Earlier, Congress had its
support from Muslims and Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Recently it seems as though their
support for Congress has been diminishing.
3.3 Economic Reform in India
3.3.1 Two Separate Reform Periods
Undoing years of state-organised economy is not an easy task and, for some, the staying
power of the Indian reforms process is surprising (Jenkins 1999: 1). In India there are
powerful groups and individuals with vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
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Bureaucrats, political elites and particular members of the private sector have traditionally
gained from their privileged positions; not only financially, but in terms of influence as
well. In theory, democracies should increase the problems associated with implementing
reform (Jenkins 1999:2). Farmers fearing the loss of subsidies, protected industrialists
_ fearing foreign competition and party leaders fearing the loss of electoral spoils are able to
unite vertically with voting blocks to oppose reform.
Early attempts to modernise the Indian economy under Rajiv Gandhi in the 1980s spoke of
such difficulties. These adjustments met with failure, despite the fact that the Gandhi
government ruled with a relatively strong mandate by conventional standards. His
Congress party was elected with 77 per cent of the seats in the Lok Sabha, the largest share
of parliamentary seats in Indian history. Yet, after three years, reforms were summarily
dropped in favour of the more comfortable state-led development schemes.
In contrast, the government in power during the inception of the massively more successful
1991 reforms, P.V. Narasimha Rao's Congress government, was comparatively weak,
garnering only 226 of the 507 parliamentary places. Despite this weakness, the reform
process initiated in 1991 is still in existence today and, according to some commentators, is
irreversible (Josiam et al 1999:78).
3.3.2 Factors Affecting Reform
3.3.2.1 Internal and External Economic Factors
The comparative success of the 1991 reforms can partly be explained by the very different
circumstances experienced by the Rao government. The increasing significance of
globalisation had transformed the international political economy and demonstrated the
opportunity costs of non-reform. Countries that had previously followed state-led
development schemes began to allow market forces to have greater impact on their
economies. China, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Korea shifted their
focus towards export markets, attracting foreign investment and placing themselves in the
global production chain of multinationals. Faced with increasingly stiff competition, India
found that its share of world trade fell from 2.4 per cent in 1947 to 0.4 per cent in 1990
(Mukerji 2002:4). It was soon apparent that India was falling behind.
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Internal and external considerations play an important part in explaining why the direction
of the 1991 reforms was maintained. Financial liberalisation had happened years earlier.
The resort to foreign finance during the eighties allowed the country to fund current
account deficits and to run large fiscal deficits. India's external debts nearly doubled from
around $35 billion at the end of 1985 to $69 billion at the end of 1990 (Cerra & Saxena
2002: 402). In the years prior, Indian internal politics had become highly competitive and
the Congress party had increasingly used contributions from the fiscus to ensure electoral
success. Financial liberalisation was a useful tool and comparatively easy to implement:
foreign borrowing allowed for the deficits needed to fulfil electoral promises, while not
harming any politically significant interest groups.
In such a manner, international resources generated through financial liberalisation were
used for short-term electoral interests, rather than long-term growth creating investment. As
more foreign funds were borrowed, the leverage of international financial institutions over
the Indian government grew, bringing with it growing external pressures for more
widespread economic reform. Furthermore, development aid became harder to acquire and
development agencies began publishing strong statements that their borrowers would have
to increasingly seek funding from international capital markets for their financing needs.
Lastly, the increasing global importance of portfolio investment and foreign direct
investment created incentives to deregulate industries and thereby attract international
capital (Dubash & Rajan 2001a:52). In these ways, pressure mounted to reform Indian
economic policy and to make it more congruent with global economic trends.
By the end of 1990, India was increasingly vulnerable to external shocks as a result of its
rising current account deficits and significant reliance on commercial external financing. In
1991, the catalyst that sparked the reform process came: a balance of payments crisis that
resulted in a reduction in the country's bond rating in international credit markets, limiting
the country's scope to use short term external borrowing to address the shortfall on their
current account (Deardorff et aI2000:2, Dubash & Rajan 2001 b:9). The crisis was reflected
in the foreign exchange reserves, which amounted to little more than $ I billion and were
only sufficient to fund three week's worth of imports (the prudent level of reserves is
generally accepted to be about three month's worth). It had been further exacerbated by the
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Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the previous year and the subsequent loss of two export markets
and the rise in spot oil prices (Rajaraman 1992:1, Cerra & Saxena 2002: 403).
For the reformists, the crisis was opportunely timed. Coming at the end of a moderate
recession and combined with existing external and internal considerations, it resulted in
considerable pressure to deregulate, or even privatise, an army of industries that had been
carefuIly controIled by a state bureaucracy for close to half a century of democratic
governance.
Changes were undertaken to address senous problems in the country's econormc
fundamentals (Deardorff et al 2000:2). In response to the balance of payments crisis, a
programme of macroeconomic stabilisation was introduced that involved the reduction of
fiscal deficit, control of the money supply, and correction of the overvalued rupee by means
of a significant devaluation. It became widely accepted that India had to transform herself
into a competitive economy, and the government of the time, led by the Congress Party,
sought to do this through liberalisation in key sectors (particularly electricity), the reduction
of licensing restrictions on industry, the lifting of government controls on the financial
sector and partial emancipation of currency transactions.
3.3.2.2 Internal Political Factors
The internal dynamics of competition amongst Indian political parties also helps to justify
the continuation of the 1991 reforms, despite the relatively weak position of the incumbent
government. Rao's ascendancy to power in June 1991 marked the end of a time of
considerable domestic turmoil. The previous government, headed by the Janata Dal, had
faIlen amidst a morass of caste and religious rioting, leading to great political uncertainty
and ultimately the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi (Cerra & Saxena 2002: 403). The country
was stiIl reeling from this furore when Rao's administration took office. No party wanted to
be seen as destabilizing the new government at a time of economic crisis as it was generally
accepted that the electorate was willing to aIlow the government time to address the
country's economic problems (Rajaraman 1992: I).
With these circumstances in mind, opposition parties introduced cut motions into
parliament to provide the opportunity for debate on specific budgetary provisions that they
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anticipated would be unpopular and undesirable. After giving the government a rhetorical
lambasting in parliamentary debate, the opposition never united to pass their motions for
fear of bringing down the minority government. Rao was allowed some breathing space.
There were also tactical reasons behind the opposition parties' desire to avoid bringing the
downfall of the Rao government. Indian election campaigns are expensive and two
campaigns had just been run in less than twenty months. A recess was needed to replenish
the campaign coffers. In addition, each party wished to increase and to consolidate its
popular support to improve their positions after the indecisive 1991 elections. The
opposition anticipated that the Congress would be compelled to implement austerity
measures that would erode its support (Dubash & Rajan 2001a:53). They surmised that,
with time, the party would dig its own grave.
Contrary to expectations, the Congress grew more popular as it implemented its early
reforms. This was dramatized by the November 1991 by-elections, in which the Congress
won eight of fifteen parliamentary seats with Rao winning by the extraordinary margin of
580,000 votes (Dubash & Rajan 2001a:53).
Paradoxically, the weaker government of Rao succeeded where Rajiv Gandhi's stronger
mandate did not. External factors like increasing globalisation and associated pressures and
the internal instability of the early nineties help to explain this phenomenon.
3.3.3 The Progress of Reform
3.3.3.1 Direction of Reform Maintained
Since 1991, the direction of reform has been generally maintained, or at least paid lip
service to, despite considerable political obstacles which have caused the pace of change to
be somewhat erratic. There is a certain level of agreement between the BJP and Congress
on matters economic. A good example can be taken from the period surrounding the fall of
the BJP government after losing a vote of confidence and prior to the 1999 general
elections3'. After the fall, Congress failed to put together an alternative ministry and left
31 India's recent political history indi arcs that coalition failure is not only possible, but also a regular occurrence: in 1999,
the BJP-Ied government lost a vote of confidence by one vote in the Lok Sabha, necessitating fresh elections, and two
49
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
suspended a critical piece of government business that had been tabled before the vote was
taken: the passage of the Union budget that had been introduced to considerable acclaim in
February of that year.
Legal requirements stated that the budget had to be passed by the Lok Sabha that was about
to be dissolved. Even though the opposition had objected strongly to certain provisions, the
budget was passed within a week, after some careful negotiation by all the parties and some
minor changes (Rediff 1999, Asia Times 1999). A host of bills affecting the economy and
other matters were left to die with the government (the business community mourned the
loss of at least some of them).
This shows up a strange paradox. Parties that had been at each others throats a few days
previously were able to pass the budget, one of most contentious documents in any regime.
A primary reason is that democracy and democratic procedure in India has become second
nature to all: it would be literally unthinkable for even a quite venal and irresponsible
politician to hold up a constitutionally necessary step. But the other reason is more prosaic:
the BIP, the Congress, and many parties of the United Front had come to accept an
economic program that differs in significant but not fundamental ways (Kux 2002: 102).
The agreement on fundamental economic policy among the parties, quite apart from the
necessity of passing the budget, is clear. The general direction of the economic reforms
instituted in response to the crisis of 1991 - though there had been early moves in that
direction over the previous decade - have essentially been accepted by everyone except the
left wing, represented mainly by the CPM. Even the socialist parties believe in measures
such as privatization of public-sector undertakings (though not of the nationalised banks).
This suggests that the reversal of the general direction of reforms is now a non-issue.
3.3.3.2 Opposition has Slowed Reform
The example presented in preceding paragraphs must not be taken to mean that parties are
in agreement about the individual content of reform, or above opposing particular reforms
to win political ground. Despite moments of cooperation at crucial junctures, the nature of
other governments in the three ycars prior to that collapsed due to the difficulties 'of keeping coalitions of diverse, not to
mention venal and opportunistic, politicians together.
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India politics has caused political actors to behave like mercenaries. Between 1991 and
2000 there were five general elections in India and five prime ministers at the central level
alone. Each time power shifted from the ruling party to the opposition (Rufin et at
2003:671). Parties that have been voted out of power have been known to curry political
favour by opposing reforms that they themselves had initiated.
In 2002, for example, the Congress party opposed the liberalisation of India's print media
industry, even though they had begun the process themselves amidst controversy almost a
decade previously. Congress was not the only in opposition. An assortment of smaller
parties, some of whom support the BIP's coalition government, also registered their
disapproval (Shahin 2002) 32.
The episode underscores the capricious nature of India political parties and the difficulties
coalition governments experience in cobbling together support for any particular change.
Reform has been a slow process and the examples given above show that the exigencies of
day-to-day politics in India are a primary reason for this:'. As the country has become
increasingly inclusive of hitherto subordinate groups and minorities, the need to find a
common ground acceptable to disparate factions has become more urgent.
India's poli tical battlefield ensures that there are few assurances that commitments made by
one government or leader will be adhered to by successive ones, or even by the initiating
regime itself when under pressure (Bardhan 2003 :5). In India, political parties seldom stick
to their election promises, particularly economic ones. As Kripalani (2002: I) notes,
development and reform are issues that have yet to win an Indian election.
3.3.4 The BJP and Economic Reform
When the BIP came to power in 1999, general opinion seemed to indicate that the new
government was unlikely to alter or reverse the direction of the 1991 reforms for the
32 Some of the arguments presented in this assignment (such as this onc) arc supported by examples that show resistance to
reform in other industries and sectors. This is not to say that reform in these other sectors is required or neccssary (the
needs of these sectors are outside the scope of this assignment). Thc examples are used to demonstrate how the reform
process can be impeded in general by rhc activities of political groups, with the implication that similar opposition can be
expected in the electricity sector where, as will be shown, rcform is in the best interest of thc investor.
33 /\ number of comments have been made in the literature and rhc prcss concerning thc slow pacc of reform. See, for
example, Kux (2002:101), The I~conomist (2001), Asia Monitor (2002), and Asiaweek (1998). 111e pace of reform is
discussed with reference to the 13) P government in the section to follow.
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foreseeable future, even though the party had campaigned on anti-Iiberalisation platforms
during the 1996 and 1998 elections (Jenkins 1999:3). There was little reason not to believe
the BIP promise to pursue economic reform through national consensus, and the party
reinforced the view that it would continue the opening of Indian markets by actively
encouraging foreign investment in core sectors, notably infrastructure. The BIP also agreed
to honour all WTO obligations made by previous governments and stated that they would
not abrogate any international treaties. Party leaders took effort to distance themselves from
their campaign rhetoric and their earlier insistence on a swadeshi econorny'",
3.3.4.1 Internal and External Reform Resistance
Yet, despite these promises and wide consensus across parties in New Delhi about the
necessity of economic change, the political reality of Indian coalition governments that the
BIP faces is that reforms often need dilution in the interests of maintaining alliances. This
in part explains why the process has occurred so slowly since 1991. In particular,
controversial reforms, such as state sector privatization, tend to act as partnership breakers
(Kripalani 1999). The era of multiparty coalitions that has dominated Indian politics since
the Congress Party's 1996 government has regularly sacrificed reform for the more
pressing issue of political survival.
Since 1991, for example, successive governments have promised but failed to open the
telecommunications industry to foreign investors (Devraj 2002). Left-leaning members of
the BIP coalition have shot down plans to raise local phone call charges and to lower prices
for long distance calls, drawing out the reform process interminably. Reforms that have
been undertaken have often seemed half-hearted.
In 2001, the government watered down its strategy to privatize the inefficient, state-owned
firm Air India. Of the 40 percent of the carrier earmarked for sale, it was decided that
foreigners would only be allowed to purchase 26 percent of the total. Additionally, Indian
nationals were required to hold two-thirds of the airline's board and to serve as chairman
and managing director. The residual government control did not rest well with private
investors (Asia Pacific Bulletin 2001).
34 "Swadcshi" loosely means "made in India". The term is a reference to a form of economic nationalism first advocated by
Mahatma Gandhi during the anti-colonial independence movement.
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Furthermore, despite fiscal austerity being a cornerstone of the reforms, the current
government has seen public expenditure balloon. At the end of fiscal year 2002/2003, the
consolidate budget deficit of the central and state governments was between 9 and 10 per
cent of GDP, one of the highest in the world for a major economy (South Asia Monitor
2003). Expectations are that 2003 will see the budget deficit once more exceed its target
(South Asia Monitor 2003). The downsizing of the expensive central bureaucracy has
proved impossible, even though Vajpayee himself has intervened.
The halting progress of reform has been noticed by outside agencies. In August of 2001,
two credit rating agencies, Moody's and Standard and Poor's, downgraded their ratings on
Indian creditworthiness because of poor progress on economic liberalization (Asia Pacific
Bulletin 2001: 1). Standard and Poor repeated their downgrade in 2002, once more citing as
a key reason the stalling reforms programme of the government.
The reform agenda is far from finished: at the end of 2002 there were at least three major
bills that had been waiting for parliamentary approval for over a year, despite each of them
being crucial to their respective areas. One of these was the Electricity Bill (Srinivasan
2002).
It would seem that, since the inception of the reform process in 1991, the politically
palatable reforms have been passed, while the more controversial ones have been delayed
and avoided, ultimately endangering the entire procedure. Rao, for example, made the bulk
of his changes through administrative orders alone; Vajpayee has had to go to the
legislature for his, requiring extensive political bargaining that a government fighting for
re-election may be unwilling or unable to do. Reform has become more difficult as the
process has progressed.
Leftwing parties, trade uruons, non-government organisations, the bureaucracy, and,
recently, even elements of the BIP itself have opposed reform since the party took office
(Devraj 2002) Compared with the Rao era, Vajpayee's government seems to have little
central thrust for reform. Manhoman Singh, Rao's Finance Minister, provided earlier thrust
by forcing budgetary changes to cut down on government spending (lyer & Bhattacharjee
2002).
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Vajpayee is the only figure with the necessary stature to enact reforms and speculation is
brewing that he will find himself isolated, along with his reformist colleagues, such as
Privatization Minister Arun Shourie and Finance Minister Jaswant Singh (Kripalani 2002).
The rightist backers of the BIP, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), have felt
particularly disillusioned by the BfP's post-electoral abandonment of the swadeshi
principle and its business friendly policies, stating that a "foreign model" of economic
growth was unacceptable and publicly criticising the "urban-based, high energy-
consuming, labour-displacing and ecologically-destructive Western model of development"
that they allege the Vajpayee government is pursuing amidst pressure from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a cadre of Indian capitalists (Devraj 2002)35. These
BIP militants are broadly regarded as both anti-Muslim and anti-reform (Kripalani 2002).
The RSS is an influential and vocal group. Through its affiliates, the Swadeshi Jagran
Manch (Forum to Protect Self-reliance) and the Bharat Mazdoor Sangh (Indian Workers
Union), it has opposed plans to raise the limit of FDI in key sectors such as oil as outlined
in a government paper. A third RSS affiliate, the Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (Indian Farmers'
Union), has warned that the present government was going the way of the 1991 Rao
government which, they contend, was voted out of power because its reforms were seen to
concentrate wealth in a narrow crust (Devraj 2002). They have used protests in the capital
to express their distaste.
Vajpayee might have been able to disregard the nationally-televised diatribes of the RSS
and its affiliates if similar views were not held by other members of his multi-party
coalition. Disinvestment, widely considered to be a crucial part of the reform process, has
been criticised internally because it allegedly advantages powerful business groups in the
name of gaining "strategic partners" in key state-run sectors. Proponents of the scheme
point out that of the 232 state-run firms, which have a combined worth of more than $33
billion, almost half are losing money (Basu 2002).
35 The relationship between the RSS and the BJP is an old one. The BJP began under the political auspices of the R5S.
Additionally, both parties are members of an umbrella organization known as Sangh Parivar. Some Indian observers,
including the Icading news magazine India Today, go so far as to call the BJ P a "front organization" for the RSS. Manv
B] P leaders, including Prime Minister Vajpaycc, are former RSS members, and some openly support the RSS. I lome
Minister I ..K. Advani provoked a storm of controversy in October when he attended the RSS's 75th Annivcrsarv
celebration ncar J\gra and declared, "The RSS exercises moral influence on the government and both Prime Minister Ara]
Bihari Vajpayee and I share a historical bonding with ir." (Myers 2001 :7-9).
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The pace of disinvestment has reached unprecedented highs under Arun Shourie's
leadership: the privatisation minister was able to raise US$1.4 billio n through divestments
over a single five month period in 2002, compared to an intake of only US$5 billion over
the previous 10 years (Basu 2002). Despite these successes, opponents of reform, including
BJP allies, have requested his removal. Internal resistance has come from four high profile
ministers from the ruling coalition government in India, namely the IT and
Telecommunication Minister Pramod Mahajan; the Minister for Petroleum Ram Naik;
Defence Minister George Fernandes (who also leads the Samata Party, a current BJP
coalition ally); and the Minister for Fertilizers and Chemicals, S. S. Dhindsa. Pressure from
these cabinet ministers has forced Vajpayee to put on hold sales that may have fetched the
government, according to a strategy outlined in parliament, an estimated $10 billion in the
current year (Basu 2002).
Objections are typically similar: divestments should benefit the ordinary Indian by
improving competitiveness and eliminating monopolies". Offering state-run companies to
large private investors will work against this, the ministers argue. It should be noted,
though, that these particular politicians happen to have vested interests in the industries in
question. The cash-rich publicly owned companies in the fields of telecommunications and
petroleum, for example, provide convenient vehicles for political and financial patronage.
Shourie himself sums up the situation as follows: "The disinvestment program has run into
a spot, I don't want to hide from that. The difficulty is that in a fragile and fractured polity
and legislature, squalls of this kind can make all the difference" (Basu 2002). Despite the
resistance, commitment to disinvestment by the BJP has remained strong. The party's
spokesman, Arun Jaitley, assures that "the recent disinvestments were a success story of the
government and will continue" (Basu 2002).
Further evidence of the opposition to reform amongst BJP allies was the removal of the
Union Minister of Power, Suresh Prabhu, in August of 2002. Prabhu, was asked to resign
by the Shiv Shena chief Bal Thakeray so that he could "do more party work" (IPG
36 George I"ernandes requested a complete review of the divestment policy a frcr the powerful Tara group bought up the
international long distance company Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL) and the Reliance group acquired Indian
Petrochemical Company Limited, alleging that rhcsc sales would create monopolies by preventing other public sector
corporations from bidding and by preventing the participation of retail investors.
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2003:37, Alvares 2002). Prabhu had been a central driving force of the reforms initiative,
launching the Accelerated Power Development and Reforms Programme last year and
introducing the new Electricity Bill of 2001 in parliament. His replacement, Anant Greete,
is regarded by many as being less aggressive than his predecessor, and some commentators
anticipate that the pace of reform may slow further (Alvares 2002). Shiv Shena is a Hindu
fundamentalist party and a close ally of the BJP, yet the Vajpayee government was
powerless to prevent the Minister's removal (Devraj 2002).
Significant opposition to electricity reform in particular has come from outside the party as
well. Speaking at a meeting of the Central Electricity Board in Kolkata, the power minister
of the state of West Bengal said that his government will oppose the provisions of the new
Electricity Bill in particular as it did not feel that "privatisation of the SEBs will solve the
problems in the power sector. There is enough possibility that the SEBs can be revived
financially within the government sector, and that is what we are trying to do" (Times of
India 2002a).
In Andhra Pradesh, the Congress actively opposed the restructuring of the state's SEB
under the ruling TDP party. This restructuring was proposed in 1997 at a meeting of
political parties as a first step to the reform of the power sector in the state. Congress, the
main opposition in Andhra Pradesh at the time, boycotted the meeting and the smaller
parties present rejected the proposal. In the ensuing months, opposition parties launched
outreach efforts, contradicting government pro-reform arguments and undermining public
support for the suggestion (World Bank 2003).
Vajpayee is standing firm in his moderate position, and has defended the need for
privatisation of state-run firms and industries on the grounds that they are loss-making and
that the capital raised from sale can be used to boost growth and meet social objectives. In
particular, he has singled out the slow pace of reform in the power sector. Yet commitment
from the executive is uncertain, as is its political ability to enact reforms. Towards the end
of 2002 it was still unclear whether the fragile nature of the ruling coalition and the
resistance to reform, both from the BJP's allies and supporters and from members of the
opposition camp, would permit the overhaul of sensitive industries.
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3.3.4.2 Hope for the Reformists
Recent events, however, have provided some hope that the reform process can be
resurrected. A decisive victory by the BIP in the Western state of Gujarat in 2002 may help
to strengthen the party and assist its reform agenda. Of the 182 seats being contested in the
state-level election, 126 were taken by the BIP. This success in Gujarat, a homeland of
hardline Hindu nationalists and a leading industrial area, may help to calm nerves within
the ruling coalition regarding controversial privatisations and subsidy cuts and may
strengthen Vajpayee's hand (Desai 2002, Dasgupta 2002). With its two-thirds majority in
Gujarat's state legislature, the BIP should be able to push through economic reforms in that
state. There is even hope that confidence in Gujarat will spill over to the national level and
allow federal level reforms to be taken forward.
Interestingly, one of the campaign issues during the elections was the question of power
provision in the state, politically significant because of the large number of agriculturalists
in the northern part of Gujarat. The Congress party promised a fixed rate of power to
farmers in the area, while the BIP insisted on metered supply (Khanna 2002). Despite this,
the BIP was able to take victory at the polls by a wide margin. The possibly implication is
that, for Gujarat at least, the use of electricity privileges as a political tool is no longer as
effective as before.
A second event that may provide impetus for change is the cabinet reshuffle of March
2003 in favour of reformists (Country Report 2003)37. During the rearrangement,
privatisation minister Arun Shourie's portfolio was enlarged to include communications
and information technology. The party's general secretary, Arun Iaitley, was admitted to
government as the new commerce and industry minister. Several reform opponents lost
their jobs.
3.4 Reform in the Indian Electricity Sector
Under the Electricity Act of 1910 (prior to Indian independence in 1947) private companies
or local authorities supplied more than 80 per cent of the total generation capacity in the
37 The cabinet makeover was aimed at boosting the BJP's appeal prior to 2003 state elections and national elections in 2004.
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country (World Bank 1993 in Dubash & Rajan 2001a:52). Independence brought with it
the new Electricity Supply Act of 1948, which assigned the duties of generation,
transmission and distribution of power to the states. Each state now constructed a verticall y
integrated state electricity board (SEB) to oversee these responsibilities and, by 1991, the
Boards controlled 70 per cent of electricity generation in the country, forming the
centrepiece of the Indian electricity infrastructure (World Bank 1991).
Financed through state government loans, the SEBs did not exhibit any form of financial
independence from the state energy ministries. Their authority was limited. Under the
control of the state governments, SEBs did not even hold sway over the critical tariff-
setting function. Furthermore, the central Indian government was responsible for electricity
policy, long-term planning, technical analysis, and project approvals through the power
Ministry, Planning Commission, and Central Electricity Authority (Ramanathan &
Bhatiani 1999:69, Dubash & Rajan 2001 a:52).
This arrangement precipitated the energy crisis that was to ensue. Well before 1991, the
sector was hamstrung by injudicious agreements with its electricity users and poor
management. Possibly the most damaging of these practices was the decision to supply free
or highly subsidised electricity to privileged consumer groups, which compounded other
technological, institutional and political problems in the sector. This next section will
consider the ongoing energy crisis and its possible causes in greater detail.
3.4.1 Problems with Power Supply
In the 1960s and 1970s, two developments began in India, one driven by technology and
the other by politics. By the late 1960s, the country had entered a period termed the Green
Revolution, and its economy was becoming increasingly dependent on the widespread use
of high-yielding crop varieties+'. The nature of agriculture was changing: fields that had
previously relied solely on rainfall were now subject to significant inputs of water and
fertilizer. Farm productivity and profits were significantly increased and in states like
Tamil Nadu and Punjab, two or three crops could be harvested each year. Early irrigation
projects were large and publicly funded, usually involving surface water resources. As the
3M l-or a discussion of the Green Revolution and its attendant political and economic conscljucnces, see Frankel (1971).
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Green Revolution gathered momentum, however, groundwater pumpmg on individual
farms with electric or diesel pumps became more popular (Dubash & Rajan 2001b:3).
There was (and still is) broad political appeal to irrigation because of the two ends that it
serves: guaranteeing food security and increasing the profits of farmers, giving them both
the resources and the incentive to organize themselves into influential voting blocks
(Monari 2002, Ladejinsky 1970:758)39. In 1967, the Congress party split and, for the first
time, the single dominant party model that had heretofore been in evidence was questioned.
Regional parties in the South quickly came to power on populist platforms and recovery of
these constituencies became an important item on the agenda of the ruling Congress under
Indira Gandhi.
The mid-1970s ensured that recovery was no simple task for the Party. The international oil
crisis of that decade had plunged the country into high inflation figures and Indira Gandhi
was under suspicion of corruption and fighting a lawsuit. Faced with these troubles, a state
of national emergency was announced, under which political foes were imprisoned,
constitutional rights abrogated and the press placed under strict censorship. Come 1977, the
Party was confident of its ability to consolidate its political support. The Emergency was
ended and national elections announced. Congress summarily lost these and was forced to
relinquish power for the first time in three decades (Dubash & Rajan 2001c:3369).
This set the scene for the first use of electricity subsidies as a political bargaining tool.
During the 1977 elections, the Congress-led southern state of Andhra Pradesh offered flat-
rate tariffs, which are based on the capacity of the pump rather than on measured
consumption, to farmers as an election promise to help Congress get re-elected (Dubash &
Rajan 2001 b:4).
The strategy migrated to neighbouring states. The non-Congress party in nearby Tamil
Nadu (the ADMK) decided to offer free electricity to certain groups of farmers in an
attempt to shore up their fragile support after they had narrowly been voted into power.
Subsequently, political leaders in Maharashtra, Karnataka and elsewhere began to view
power privileges as an effective political tool, partly due to the growing political power of
39 The fanners who benefited the most from the revolution where those whose farms were large enough to justify the
investment in an irrigation well. Smaller farmers and labourers did not see the same benefits (Kanel 19 4:198). The
Green Revolution helped to concentrate power in the hands of the wealthy.
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backward rural communities and partly because of the rise of the middle-class farmers'
movement. Power subsidies were used as routine political instruments all through the
1980s, especially in agricultural states (Dubash & Rajan 2001 c:3369).
Typically, the arguments for electricity subsidies are made on behalf of poorer farmers
whose livelihood, it is claimed, would be endangered without free or reduced cost energy.
Studies suggest, however, that the main beneficiaries of the concessions are the "kulak" or
landed classes, who use the added profits to invest in irrigation infrastructure, using the
water to either produce high value crops or to supplement their incomes by selling to other
farmers (Sant & Dixit 1996). There may even be popular opposition amongst the poorer
farmers to electricity subsidies as such measures can be seen as a way of furthering
empowering the wealthy.
Nevertheless, despite the relatively small number of farmers that benefit directly from the
subsidies, political parties have struggled to ring changes that might concede electoral
territory to the opposition, due to the fragile nature of the political structure of most states
and the relative strength and bargaining power of the entrenched lobby groups.
3.4.1.1 Implications
The extent of the subsidy problem is large. The World Bank estimates that electricity tariffs
for farmers in India amount to less than 10 per cent of the cost of supply (Monari 2002).
This means that the power subsidy for the agricultural sector is about $6 billion each year-
equivalent to 25 per cent of India's fiscal deficit, twice the annual spending on health or
rural development and two and a halftimes yearly spending on irrigation.
A second problem is that flat rate or free electricity has rendered the meter redundant, and
existing meters are often no longer monitored, or have even been removed and returned to
the SEBs (Dubash & Rajan 2001 :53). In Andhra Pradesh (where electricity subsidies were
first used as campaign tools) the situation has become untenable. In 1999, the entire
agricultural community of 1.8 million electricity consumers in the state had un-rnetered
connections (Narayan 1999:4). Nearly 30 per cent of power generated for the state was
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spent on agriculture, yet the power board received only 3 per cent of its revenue from this
sector".
Simply put, the cost of maintaining the meters and installing new ones as power was
extended to new businesses and communities was too great, considering that the meters
themselves served no function. This "de-metering" has increased the financial and
organizational challenge associated with the re-introduction of a consumption based tariff,
and "re-metering" is likely to meet with popular resistance from a public accustomed to a
meter-less society.
The subsidy policies have had spill-over effects in terms of the governance of the SEBs.
Poor metering (or even no metering) resulted in highly inaccurate assessments of the
quantity of electricity being subsidised. This inadequate knowledge of the electricity load
for agriculture created a convenient cover for losses of a politically sensitive nature. As it is
tremendously difficult to accurately apportion the quantity of electricity used by farmers,
losses due to theft or because of technical inadequacies could be conveniently allocated to
agricultural consumption.
Furthermore, the de-metering and subsequent inaccuracy of measurement made it
impossible for the SEBs to claim adequate compensation from state governments that had
declared social policies of electricity subsidies for agriculture. This meant that these losses
had to be borne by the SEBs themselves, even though the parties in power received the
political benefit of the donated electricity. To make up for these deficits, many SEBs
developed a complex system of cross-subsidies from other areas of their business, typically
relying on their industrial consumers to fund the shortfall. Eventually, it became cheaper
for industrialists to establish their own generators to supplement or replace SEB electricity.
In 1960, industrial consumption accounted for 67 per cent of SEB sales, but by 1991 its
share had subsided to 40 per cent (TERI 1993). The end result was that cross-subsidies
were insufficient to compensate for the shortfall in revenues.
With their income statements in the red, SEBs began to look elsewhere to break even.
Employees of the electricity boards were the first to suffer: staff development budgets were
40 This state of affairs has had a devastating impact on the local environment. Agricultural pumps have notoriously low
efficiency rates, so agriculturalists use high powcr motors to compensate. Much energy is wasted 3S a resulr. Farmers rend
to lift more water than they require, with deleterious effects (Narayan 1999).
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cut, real wages became stagnant or even negative and sales per employee were registered as
being amongst the lowest in the world (Gutierrez 1993). Staff morale plummeted.
Of the electricity generated, about 21-22 per cent was lost in the process of transmission
and distribution (T&0) (IOFC 1998). A significant portion of these losses is attributable to
inadequate metering and theft of electricity (Kux 2002: lOS). The difference between the
amount of electricity generated and the amount actually metered is recorded as T&0
losses. The concept has become a catch-all accounting measure. Theft is a major problem,
although exactly how much occurs is hard to pinpoint. A relatively large proportion of
electricity generated is transmitted at low voltages (beneath 11 kV), making theft less
hazardous and easier to commit.
As a result of these compounded problems, the SEBs found themselves in an unenviable
position: they were facing growing loss-making sections of their business, while driving off
their profitable business attempting to cross-subsidise their deficits. Poor training, low
wages and the resulting bad morale was leading to bad service and a vicious downwards
spiral of financial losses and wage and development cuts.
3.4.2 Power Sector Reform Since 1991
It was in October of 1991 that the Power Ministry began to circulate a number of
notifications aimed at encouraging private sector participation in the electricity sector. The
India Electricity Act 1910 and the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 were amended in 1991 to
allow private investors to establish generating stations to supply power in bulk with the
consent of state governments (0' sa et al 1999).
Under these acts, prevailing legislation was radically revised and independent power
producers (IPPs) were allowed to enter into long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs)
with the SEBs. At this stage in the reform process, the inclusion of private producers was
seen as a way of adding additional resources to the state-run industry: privatisation per se
was not necessarily intended. In fact, the problems in the sector were regarded as the result
of capacity shortages rather than the result of the extreme fiscal crises of the state boards.
The 1991 amendments were intended to address these shortages, and were never aimed at
solving the structural problems in the sector (Upaday 2000: 1023).
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Significant incentives were introduced to woo IPPs. Government policy allowed for higher
debt capital, higher allowance of depreciation charges, and recovery of fixed cost including
post tax return on equity of 16 per cent, provided that the plant operated at its rated capacity
for at least 6000 hours a year (Sarkar & Sharma 2001 :2, Dubash & Rajan 2001 b: 10).
There were additional bonuses for improved capacity utilisation and a five year tax holiday,
a two part tariff (the first to cover fixed costs, including asset return, and the second to
allow for variable costs) and counter-guarantees from the central government to cover
default by SEBs.
After the amendment of the Acts, state governments followed a competitive bidding route
for potential projects. The system that was constructed was clearly intended to attract
foreign capital, because it allowed 100 per cent foreign equity and insisted that Indian
financial institutions not be responsible for more than 60 per cent of the total debt
component of any project (Dubash & Rajan 2001 b: 10).
Initially, there was great excitement regarding the reforms and delegates from the Power
Ministry sojourned abroad to brief potential investors in other countries, offering
concessions and incentives that were hitherto unheard of in the power industry (D'sa et al
1999). A slew of tenders for generation contracts were made; the initial rush saw more than
200 proposals with a combined capacity addition of over 78 000 MW - a total investment
of US$ 80 billion (Upaday 2000: 1023). Most of the major global power players were
represented, including Enron, AES, Cogentrix, and CMS Energy.
Despite the euphoria, there were rumblings of discontent right from the start (Dubash &
Rajan 2001 b: 11). Il'Ps were indignant about the bureaucratic delays in obtaining
permissions and clearances and were concerned about the recovery of dues from the SEBs.
In response to these worries, the IPPs joined together in 1995 under the Independent Power
Producers Association of India (IPPAf). This organisation rapidly acquired the role of
government lobbyist, taking steps to shape the direction and pace of reform through
conferences and workshops and by discussing issues from financing, fuel allocation and
regulation, to environmental and consumer concerns.
Central government was not unified over the Il'P policy. Support for the reforms came
mostly from the Ministry of Power and the Ministry of Finance. One reported view is that
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although the IPP policy was "flawed", it was the nevertheless the best option at the time
(Dubash & Rajan 2001a:S6). Within the Ministries there were voices of dissension and
concern that the incentives offered to the foreign investors were so generous that they
would result in net outflows of foreign exchange rather than inflows.
Recognising concerns over the speed of implementation and the need for rapid addition to
generating capacity, the central government declared eight of the most promising offers as
"fast track" projects, granting them expedited clearance procedures and escrow accounts
against non-payment of dues by SEBs (Vaghul 1999:8-9). One of these was the Enron
Power Project; the other seven were awarded to multinational energy companies such as
Daewoo, China Light, Cogentrix Energy, Electricite de France, National Power and
STCMC.
Since the end of the nineties, the concept of "fast-track" has lost its relevance. Little has
emerged from the plan, and the need to increase the pace of private power generation
remains unchanged (IPG 2003:37-38). The eight projects were intended as test cases and
were to be cleared as quickly as possible. Despite this, they ran into complex clearance and
procedural issues, including fuel and transport linkage impediments, complications over
approval of project costs and tariffs, renegotiation of power purchase arrangements,
difficulties in negotiating and obtaining the centre's counter-guarantee and even litigious
and political controversy (Sahi 1998: 163). The slow-moving bureaucratic procedures and
the tedious interaction with both the state level and central governments have stunted the
addition of power capacity":
Of particular interest to this argument is the pressure investors experienced to accept re-
negotiated power purchase agreements after deals had been signed. There are three notable
examples involving Enron Power, Cogentrix Energy and BPL Power. The first highlights
the danger of underestimating how political change and uncertainty play important roles in
energy projects.
·11 The array of clearances that the so-called fast-tracked projects required was bewildering. Some of the statutory ones
including cost estimate clearance, techno-economic clearance from the Central Electricity f\gency, water availability
clearance from the state government, pollution clearance, forest and environment clearance, and rehabilitation and
resettlement clearance from the Ministry of Environmental Affairs. Non-statutory clearances included land availability
from state governments, fuel linkages from the departments of coal and petroleum and natural gas, transportation
clearances from the ministries of railways, and shipping and transport clearances (Sarkar & Sharma 2001 :3).
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3.4.2.1 Enroll Power
In April of 1992, Houston-based Enron was invited to bid for a power project to be
established in the state of Maharashtra under the company's Indian subsidiary, Oabhol
Power Company (OPC). The PPA signed in 1993 between the OPC and the Maharashtra
SEB (MSEB) was for 2015 MW power projects, backed by a credible security package
including a letter of credit, escrowing of MSEB 's cash flows, guarantee from the Congress-
led Government of Maharashtra and a counter guarantee from the Government of India
(Sarkar & Sharma 2001 :4). Both fuel and exchange rate risk were to be limited by
permission to pass price fluctuations on to consumers. The deal was completed with
alacrity and secrecy, even though it was a sizable investment that amounted to an estimated
expenditure of around US$1.3 billion each year (Oubash & Rajan 2001a:58).
In February of 1995, sensing electoral reverses in upcoming state elections, the government
of the day, the Union Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Power acted quickly to provide
the necessary clearances to bring into effect the PPA (Sahi 1998:394). In June 1995, a
newly elected Shiv Sena-BIP government of Maharashtra scrapped the project alleging
high costs and corruption, and proposed instead to invite competitive bids42. The
Ministerial Review Committee that oversaw the termination of the contract ruled that
neither damages nor compensation should be paid. International response was negative and
the sustainability and viability oflndia's reform programme was questioned.
Allegations of under-handed dealings began to surface (Kux 2002: 104). Power sector
officials were accused of bending laws to accommodate Enron's requests and of
sidestepping procedures to obtain the necessary clearances. A Human Rights Watch
investigation unearthed evidence of systematic suppression of expression and assembly by
the state government and discovered that violence had allegedly been used or threatened
against opponents of the project (Oubash & Rajan 2001a:58).
These problems notwithstanding, two months after the cancellation of the project, a new
PPA was signed under recommendation of a government committee. The state government
requested a reduction in tariff, a cut in project cost, a shareholding stake in the scheme to be
42 The 13JP had campaigned during the run-up to the elections on a pia tform of national self-reliance. l\ central tenet of
their manifesto had been the scrapping of the Dabhol project (Sahi 1998:394).
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given to the MSEB at face value and complete environmental protection. According to
Enron, each day spent in negotiation added approximately US$250 000 to the company's
costs (Sahi 1998:399). The project was revived but, by 2000, had begun to generate severe
financial problems for the previously viable SEB. In order to honour its obligation, the state
had to buy power from the Dabhol project at twice the average production cost of
electricity in Maharashtra.
The MSEB defaulted on its payment in October 2000 due to poor financial health. The
DPC followed its contractual provisions, attempting to operate the escrow account and
invoke the state and central guarantees, but these were not honoured (Sarkar & Sharma
2001 :5). Following an appeal by the MSEB, the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory
Commision (MERC) restricted the DPC from accessing the funds that had been stored in
the escrow account, and ordered the company not to instigate any arbitration proceedings
against the MSEB. The company eventually invoked its counter-guarantee and dues were
settled. Enron officials reportedly mobilised senior U.S-government officials to put
pressure on the Indian central government (Dubash & Rajan 2001a:59). Shortly thereafter,
Enron's own troubles began to surface and the company put its stake in DPC up for sale.
3.4.2.2 IPP problems
Dubash and Rajan list several of the implications that the IPP policy had for the sector
(2001a:56). Firstly, key institutions for long term planning and technical and economic
clearance were undermined. The favouritism shown to the investors raised the ire of some
government departments and officials, who complained that the playing fields were tilted in
favour of the foreign producers.
Secondly, the focus on rapid capacity expansion excluded the consideration of a more
rational least-cost planning approach. Thirdly, the projects enabled shady deal making and
malfeasance. Projects were not typically selected through competitive bids and purchase
agreements were concluded non-transparently, despite their considerable reliance on long-
term public financial obligations.
Finally, the IPP policy had a polarising effect on many levels. Early support by members of
the middle class and industry became replaced by anger towards public interest advocates
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at the perceived obstructionist stance adopted by the latter. Government itself was divided
into two camps over the issue: those who saw the policy as the best of a selection of poor
options, and those who were vehemently opposed from the start.
As Dubash and Rajan conclude: "technically, economically and politically, the policy
created a hangover effect for future attempts at reform" (2001a:57).
3.4.2.3 The Need for SEE Reform
At the hemt of the sector's problems lie the SEBs, sandwiched between the consumer, the
power producers and various political forces. Their role is varied from state to state, but
they act generally as an intermediate end user, distributing power purchased from other
producers or generating it themselves. Low revenue returns prevent the Boards from
meeting their operating expenses while allowing for both interest on loan capital and
deprecation. A direct cause of the SEBs' losses is their inability to set their tariffs in
accordance with their marginal costs, with the result that the cost of generating power is
nearly Rs 1.50 per kWh, while actual average return from the sale of power is
approximately Rs 0.96 per kWh (Sahi 1998:97).
The dependence of the SEBs on government has been a considerable contributor to their
current predicament. Without sufficient independence in tariff setting, SEBs did not have
the financial ability to raise the necessary capital to expand capacity. Government
initiatives in the sector were aimed at permitting and attracting private participation to
provide the necessary resources, not at restructuring the sector to empower the SEBs to
perform this function themselves.
Ironically, private participation will place more pressure on the Boards if the current system
is maintained, because the costs of private capital invested in private generation will have
to be paid for by the SEBs through the tariffs they impose and the power purchase
arrangements they enter into with private investors (Sahi 1998:98). Herein is the crux of the
problem for the foreign investor: the State Boards are the sole purchasers of the bulk of
privately produced power in the country, yet are financially weak because of their inability
to collect revenues, their technical and non-technical losses, and their forced subsidies to
the agricultural and domestic markets.
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3.4.2.4 World Bank Reforms
Although it seemed clear to many in India that the technical, financial and management
problems of the SEBs were the root of the electricity dilemma, very little consensus existed
on how to unravel the political tangle that impeded their reform. The World Bank entered
the fray, using the failing IPP plan as an open door for its 1993 policy for lending to the
power sector. This was pioneered in the state of Orissa and later advocated for others
(World Bank 2002a).
The Orissa reforms, centred on unbundling and privatisation, were intended to significantly
restructure the SEBs and were thus far further reaching than the capacity focused IPP
policy. A central part of the state level reform is the establishment of independent
regulatory bodies responsible for the rationalisation of consumer taliffs.
The operational performance of the Orissa SEB was the poorest of all the electricity boards
in India. This inability to pay for power prohibited investment in the sector, and resulted in
a peak demand shortage of as much as 40 per cent in 1995 (Sahi 1998: 113). Several factors
contributed to this weak financial base, including inefficient capitalisation, low tariffs, poor
bill collection methods, and certain state government policies that required it to undertake
non-remunerative projects without appropriate compensation.
Orissa's Electricity Reform Act was passed in 1995. As part of the reform programme, the
Orissa SEB was unbundled and dissolved and, in 1996, the Orissa Electricity Regulatory
Commission (OERC) was established with a mandate to issue and enforce licenses,
regulate licensees, promote economic efficiency and safety in transmission, distribution and
use, regulation of tariffs, and promotion of competition (Ramanathan & Bhatiani 1999:73).
The approach has been to privatise the generation and succession business at the earliest
and to privatise the transmission business at a later stage 43.
The selection of Orissa as the testing ground for reform was facilitated by the state's low
levels of political mobilisation and its low national political profile. With a small
,13 The model chosen by Orissa was one of five suggested by the central government to reform the SEBs and to make them
financially viable. Each model has its differences, but all propose the establishment of independent regulatory
commissions to increase the pace of tariff revision and to hand power distribution over to private entities (Sa hi
1998:108). The models deal with the future of the SJ;Bs differently, some advocate their complete withdrawal from the
sector, some their corporarisarion, and others their unbundling.
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dependence on electricity in the agriculture sector, Orissa's farmer lobby was weak44. This
meant that tariff increases, which have inherent political and social implications, were
easier to pass. This is vastly more difficult to achieve in other states where the agricultural
sector relies heavily on government subsidies given through SEBs.
Despite the lack of political opposition to tariff reform, the international consultants
contracted by the World Bank to advise the unbundling did have political issues with which
to contend, for example minimising layoffs to avoid union opposition". They were also
responsible for electing a single buyer system for Orissa based on their assessment that the
commercial, institutional and technical capabilities in the state were insufficient to support
wholesale competition (Dubash & Rajan 2001:58).
Since Orissa's unbundling of its SEBs, other states, such as Haryana, Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, have followed suit, using mildly adapted
strategies (D'sa 1999).
3.4.3 Opposition to Tariff Restructuring
Opposition to tariff restructuring has been a consistent problem In the sector and the
resulting lack of political will to adjust tariffs has contributed to the financial difficulties of
the SEBs. Electricity provision is a subject of the concurrent list, meaning that,
constitutionally, both the states and the Union have authority over how prices are set. Each
state can fix its electricity tariff according to its requirements, but this has led to several
problems for the Union government in opening the power sector to foreign and private
investment. To resolve these problems, uniformity in pricing is being devised across the
country. The sensitive nature of power tariffs and the way that they have been used as
political implements makes the states hesitant to accept a centrally decided electricity rate.
This in turn makes it difficult to decide upon a rational and sustainable electricity tariff and
vocal groups within states are inclined to oppose attempts at realistic tariff restructuring.
·1'1 Agriculture consumes only 6 pcr cent of the state's power supply (Sahi 1998:128).
45 Current labour policies in India are not conducive to retrenchment. The need to retrench is likely to increase in the
future, as Orissa reforms are adapted and applied in other stares. The issue of job loss will become an increasingly
important clement of how the Orissa model is accepted and changed by other states (Sahi 1998: 136).
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In November of 2002, the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board's (TNEB) proposal to increase
tariffs was vehemently opposed by electricity user groups who, significantly, used the
hearing to agitate for a review of the purchasing agreements previously entered into with
the independent power producers in the state (BusinessLine 2002a)46.
Representatives of agriculturalist unions, industry, power sector employee umons and
consumer groups claimed that the high rates charged by the IPP were unnecessary and that
cheaper power could be bought from central utilities like the National Thermal Power
Corporation. The National Agriculturists Awareness Movement, in particular, objected to
the TNEB's proposal to levy a tariff on agricultural connections, citing that free power was
the only concession the farm sector had been given by Government, whereas every other
sector of society had been granted some form of concession.
Furthermore, the PPAs signed with the IPPs had expected a high debt equity ratio and had
therefore allowed for high tariffs to finance that debt. As prevailing interest rates had
declined, the representatives argued, there existed scope for tari ff reduction. The interest
groups also called for the TNEB to enter into a contract with consumers, guaranteeing
uninterrupted electricity at the correct voltage and frequency.
A similar example can be drawn from the state of Andhra Pradesh, where the state
regulatory commission announced power tariff hikes in June of 2000 (Il'AN 2000). The
proposed increases, which would require consumers at all levels to pay substantially more
for their electricity, were unsurprisingly met by large-scale protest. Under the new regime,
domestic consumers would suffer the most, as the bill for some households was expected to
be almost a 100 per cent greater, despite the average increase in tariff for domestic
consumers being around 54 per cent. The average increase in tariff for non-domestic
consumers was 15 per cent, 14 per cent for Low Tension industries, 35 per cent for cottage
industries and 61 per cent for participants in the agricultural sector.
In an attempt to appease irate voters, the state government subsequently announced an
electricity subsidy aimed at softening the blow. While government officials were concerned
that it would be difficult to raise the required amount, Rs 250 crores, political rivals of the
46 Over 400 objections were tabled from all sections of onsurncrs (Business Line 2002b)
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ruling Telugu Desam Party attempted to cash in on the voter despair, rejecting the amount
as 'too little'": They threatened to launch a joint agitation to oppose the new tariffs.
The opposition leaders in the state assembly also protested vehemently against the state
government's proposal to promulgate an ordinance imposing stiffer penalties for power
theft. Andhra Pradesh's SEB reportedly reportedly loses Rs 9 crores every day due to large
scale pilferage of power. The opposition, however, contends that it is the lack of
"affordable" power that makes theft necessary (IPAN 2000).
The implications of such resistance are important for potential investors In the sector.
Firstly, the complaints raised by the agriculturalists' union demonstrate how consumers
view the role of government, and indicate that the desire for liberalising economic reform is
not shared at all levels.
Secondly, this example demonstrates how persuasively user groups can put forward
demands for PPA revision. Even if their demands are not met, there is an immediate
practical implication of their lobbying - decisions are delayed with possibly deleterious
results for producers. No decision was reached in Tamil Nadu, and subsequent sittings were
arranged for the coming month. As a result of this resistance, the SEB's scope to influence
the price it sets for its electricity is limited, rendering it unable to meet the supply and
demand of the market effectively and hobbling its ability to weather fluctuations in the
business environment.
Thirdly, the incident demonstrates how organised these groups are and how quickly they
can mobilise. Lastly, the demand for restructuring of the PPA was based on the existing
low interest rate regime not reflecting the original debt repayment requirements in the
agreement. If a restructuring is performed and interest rates subsequently rise, this hearing
would indicate that there will be little scope for the SEB to negotiate a subsequent rise in
tariffs to compensate, as consumer groups seem to see tariffs as only adjustable
downwards.
~7 This is not the first time that the opposition parties in Andhra Pradesh have hindered electricity reform in the state.
When the ruling Telugu Dcsarn Party tabled the controversial Andhra Pradesh Elccrriciry Reforms Bill in 1998, all
members of the opposition, barring the 1-3)P,dubbed the bill as "anti-people and anti-employees" (l ndialvxprcss 1998a).
Despite the resistance, the Chief Minister, N Chandrababu Naidu, asserted the need for reform amidst growing energy
demands. The Bill was only passed after the members of the opposition were suspended from the house on account of
stalling and abusive behaviour (l ndia lixprcss 1998b).
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3.4.4 Electricity Bill 2001
The Electricity Bill that was originally introduced into the Lok Sabha in August of 2001 is
the most dramatic initiative taken thus far by the central government to exercise leadership
over the sector (Dubash & Rajan 2001a:62). Unlike the state level reforms, the Bill has
been initiated and led by the Ministry of Power, with relatively little input from the World
Bank. The draft Bill (originally tabled in a different form in 2000) was approved, subject to
modifications, by a standing committee in February of 2003 and passed by both the Lok
Sabha and the Rajya Sabha in April to replace existing legislation governing the country's
power sector, namely, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, Electricity Supply Act, 1948, and
Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998 (BusinessLine 2001).
Although the Bill itself was only compiled and introduced to parliament in 2001, many of
its provisions have been subjects of discussion since 1993 when a committee of the
National Development Council, comprising six chief ministers, was established (Godbole
2002). Despite a litany of conferences and resolutions since the committee's first meeting,
little has been done thus far to implement proposed changes.
The new Bill is intended to bring together the Committee's suggestions and to enforce
them through law. It seeks to free power generation from licensing, while allowing captive
power plants to sell their surplus power directly to bulk consumers without going through
the grid operated by State Electricity Boards. States will be required to unbundle their
SEBs, and to establish independent State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) that
will be responsible for the setting of electricity prices. Govemment has been prohibited
from issuing directives on tariff matters and will, according to the Bill, be held responsible
for the cost of any subsidy provided at its direction. Distribution and transmission
companies will have to obtain licenses from the concerned SERe. Power reforms will be
boosted by reduced cross-subsidisation and metering of electricity supply will be
mandatory (BusinessLine 2001).
The most important consideration II1 the proposed legislation is that it will end the
monopoly of SEBs in the distribution of electricity and will allow power generation
companies to sell directly to consumers. Furthermore, the legislation will override state
level laws, allowing direct as well as third party sales. This is, of course, a significant step,
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as power producers are currently mandated to sell electricity only to the government-run
SEBs (IPAN 2001).
The Bill has received positive responses from business. The Confederation of Indian
Industry has voiced positive support for the Bill, lauding its intention of ushering in a
competitive market for electricity, and describing electricity stakeholders as "enthused" by
the Bill's prospects (CII 2000)48.
Labour's response to the Bill, however, has been less favourable. The Electricity
Employees Federation of India voiced strong opposition and began mobilisation to halt its
passage through parliament. Protests greeted the run-up to the parliamentary debate
regarding the new legislation in the first quarter of 2003. Terming the Bill as "against
national interest", the Federation stated that attempts to remove cross-subsidisations of
agriculture's electricity would spell doom for farmers (Financial Express 2003).
3.4.4.1 Troubled Passage
The new legislation's passage through parliament was far from effortless. The subject of
three years of debate, the Bill was only passed by the Lok Sabha after 127 amendments had
been made to the original document. In the Upper House, opposition parties favoured a
further 81 amendments that spanned a broad range of issues. One tabled amendment sought
to change the most basic tenet of the Bill, the unbundling of the SEBs, while another
suggested that states be allowed to obtain finance from the Centre to subsidise "a class of
consumers" if the tariff determined by the SERCs did not suit the political compulsions of
state governments (Kumar 2003).
Rajya Sabha approval was only granted after the government promised to table a
comprehensive bill in the next parliamentary session to incorporate outstanding
recommendations of the Standing Committee on Electricity (IndianExpress 2003). The
opposition agreed, on the strength of this promise, to withdraw its proposed amendments
and allow the Bill to be passed.
48 ell is a lobby group for Indian industry that acts at both state and central level.
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The Bill, with its focus on market-driven forces, is the first comprehensive attempt at
forward-looking legislation that will be able to keep pace with the changing economic
scenario. Previous bills had been intended for a monopolised rather than market-driven
sector, and the piecemeal legislative changes made during the nineties had not attempted to
address this discrepancy. Although the Bill is not perfect, it does favour foreign investment
and takes steps to create an enabling environment for the foreign company. At the very
least, it attempts to redress some of the root causes of the high levels of deleterious political
risk experienced by external players in the market before, most notably the role of the SEBs
and the factors that have contributed to their financial instability, particularly tariff setting
and subsidies.
3.5 Conclusion
The political dynamic of the Indian federalist structure and its coalition politics have
important implications for policy making. The reliance of the party in power at the centre
on support from patties on a state-level increases the number of actors who have influence
on policy decisions and hinders the ability of the central government to determine and
implement policy changes. Furthermore, the powerful regional parties on whom national
governments rely often have parochial objectives incongruent to those of the centre. This,
exacerbated by other factors such as internal party disunities and external resistance, has
contributed to the retardation of the reform process in recent years. There have been
implications for the potential foreign investor in the Indian Electricity Sector, where
various attempts at change have done little to solve core problems.
Power reform has been an erratic and often piecemeal process. Although the need for
reform of the SEBs is obvious, powerful stakeholders have provided considerable
resistance to the process, propagating and contributing to the problems in the sector.
Attempts to open the sector to foreign participation have been typified by a "big bang"
approach - high profile, high capacity deals such as the PPA brokered with Enron have
been concluded, only to be broken by the political mechanism relatively shortly thereafter.
This has caused considerable damage to the country's reputation as a safe destination for
investment and has undermined the reform process. Sporadic and uncoordinated reform
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attempts have harmed the legitimacy of the process and have called into question the
wisdom of reform. Stakeholders are increasingly sceptical of the merits of a privati sed
power generation sector. The new Electricity Bill is an attempt to create a sense of cohesion
in the sector, but it remains to be seen how successful it will be.
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4 ANALYSIS OF THE PCI AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter compares the reform experiences of India, Brazil and China and discusses the
Political Constraints Index and its implications for each. A study by Rufin et al (2003:653)
indicates why, from the micro risk perspective of the electricity sector, it is useful to
compare these three countries:
• In the past, all three have attempted to accelerate economic growth through heavy
state involvement, particularly in the electricity sector;
• In the past decade, all three have formulated and implemented policies intended to
attract foreign investment into the electricity sector;
• In the 1990s, all three were faced with a massive need for additional power
capacity;
• All three were lumbered with inefficient and often corrupt state-owned power
sectors, adding to high budget deficits and pressures to reduce the country's fiscal
burden;
• During the past decade, each of them undertook to invite IPPs to participate in the
production and sale of power domestically.
Finally, the PCI for India is related to previous discussions of the political economy of the
Indian Electricity sector.
4.2 India in the Broader Context
As a bicameral parliamentary system and functioning democracy with an independent
judiciary, India has a number of veto players able to prevent the executive from operating
with impunity. This raises the expectation that the level of India's political constraints
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should be high and the Political Constraints Index reflects this49. The value of the index for
2001 is 0.735, with 1 as a theoretical maximum. This ranks India 41s1 out of the 161
countries for whom the index has been tabulated. In other words, India's political
constraints are high enough to place the country in the top quarter of the field, with the
theoretical implication that the country's level of political risk should be lower than 75 per
cent of the countries considered".
With its index at 0.735 for 2001, India compares with countries such as the Netherlands
(0.733), the United Kingdom (0.737), Greece (0.74), France (0.74) and South Africa
(0.744). Towards the top of the index lie Switzerland (0.82), the United States (0.85),
Australia (0.867) and Belgium (0.894).
4.3 The PCI for China, Brazil and India
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Figure 6: The Political Constraints Index for China, Brazil and
India
49 The figures for the PCI arc taken from l lcnisz ' Polcon2002 database, which can be downloaded from his website:
hrrp: IIwww·rnall'll'l·rnCI11.whartol1.lIl)(;l1l1.cJu/hcni,z/. The index used is the Polcon V_2002 index.
50 Some countries have been omitted from the PCI on the grounds that there is insufficient information available for the
computation of the index.
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Figure 6 compares the PCI for India with that of Brazil and China51 for the period 1975 to
200l.
Rufin et ai's study shows that China has been the most effective in restructuring its
electricity industry so far, adding substantial new capacity through FDI (2003:654). Brazil
has been moderately successful through the implementation of IPP policies, while India has
been the least successful of the three.
According to Rufin et aI, China's success can be attributed to ideological and institutional
factors and the absence of powerful interest groups. Its powerful combination of
communist ideology, nationalistic ambitions and pragmatism, combined with the central
bureaucracy's control over policy creation, the relatively frictionless implementation of
policy, the close coordination between government policies and provincial governments, a
weak judiciary and repressed interest groups has enabled it to create a large IPP sector that
sells power to state-owned integrated monopolies'".
Consider now the PCI for China. As the index is essentially a measure of the strength of
democratic institutions aimed at limiting the power of the executive, it demonstrates a
Western bias that discriminates against countries that do not embrace democratic principles
or at least allow for checks-and-balances on executive power. Countries such as China and
Singapore, because they do not subscribe to Western forms of government, register at the
bottom of the measure and are therefore, by Henisz's interpretation, subject to a lack of
policy stability and therefore considerable political risk.
Rufin et al's study demonstrates that the lack of opposition to the creation and
implementation of reform policies in China has allowed the country to SCUlptan electricity
sector that is attractive to foreign investors and that is perceived by them to be "stable and
friendly" (2003:654).
Return once more to the definition presented earlier. It states that political risk is the
probability of change in the operating environment of a firm because of the political
51 The People's Republic of China.
52 The authors mean pragmatism in terms of flexibility with rCf,tard ro how ends can be achieved. They site Deng Xiaoping's
reponed statement' that "it did not matter whether the cat was black or white so long as it caught mice" (Rufin ~I of
2003671).
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process. It expressly allows for changes both good for and damaging to the investor.
Against this definition, the experiences in China's electricity sector support Henisz's view
that China must be high risk, but place the emphasis for useful decision making on the
perspective and orientation of China's centralist government. In this instance, the ability of
China's leadership to push through reforms has been beneficial to potential investors.
The implication is that a simplistic view of the PCI may well lead to inaccurate
conclusions. For the future investor in infrastructure in China, this argument shows that the
index would only be useful when combined with an in depth understanding of the Chinese
political environment. It is debatable how such an understanding can best be achieved, but
a comprehensive qualitative assessment (such as the one presented by Rufin et a12003) is a
good starting point.
Brazil's efforts to restructure its electricity sector have fared better than India's but not as
well as China's. The country has been somewhat successful at attracting FOI, but has not
yet been able to reach its targets. According to the authors, Brazil's mixture of nationalism
and social democratic ideology, its distrust of foreign investment, its approach of designing
policy at the federal level but of implementing policy at the state level, the slow process of
its courts, the influence of patronage politics and its relatively vocal interest groups have
created mixed (private and public) infrastructure ownership in an unbundled industry, with
some residual integrated, state-owned monopolies at provincial levels (Rufin et al
2003:657).
Once more, the predictions of the PCI support this, but in a non-intuitive way. For most of
the 1990s, Brazil's level of constraints was lower than India's, implying that changes to
policies could occur more easily. This has allowed the country to open its electricity
industries to foreign investors, but not without some opposition, mainly represented by the
Brazilian judicial process and increasingly powerful interest groups (comprised of
managers of state owned generators, construction companies previously advantaged by
political patronage, consumers and environmentalists) (Rufin et al 2003:665). Registering
lower on the index, Brazil is subject to lower levels of policy stability and greater levels of
political risk. It has been able to reform its electricity sector comparatively more
successfully than India and in a way relatively beneficial to investors.
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Considering the PCI for India, certain interesting points can be noted. After 1991, at the
same time as the most recent trend towards liberalisation, constraints in India increased
dramatically. This was a consequence, mainly, of the addition of an effective judiciary, but
it also related to the increased fractionalisation of Indian politics. The liberalisation trend of
the 1990s has been discussed above and it was concluded that the general direction of the
trend has been maintained, despite government changes and various opportunistic attempts
at opposition.
What was also shown in previous discussions was that the progress of reform has grown
consistently slower, possibly because recent reforms have required legislative approval and
consequent political bargaining. The PCI for India supports these observations: the
increasing levels of political constraints, as the index predicts, have led to policy stability
and an institutionalised resistance to change that has been detrimental to the reform
process.
This has implications for the electricity sector where, as it has been shown, continued
reform towards liberalisation is in the interests of private participants in the sector. From
previous discussions, the following can be derived:
• As electricity production is an item on the concurrent list and, as such, is within the
jurisdiction of both the federal and state level governments, crafting a consensual
plan for reform has proven difficult. This inherent constitutional conflict regarding
federal and provincial primacy has resulted in a lack of coordination between states
and the central government with regard to power reform. Although Indian
leadership has generally identified and agreed on the need for private participation
in the sector, the large number of political entities with divergent objectives has
complicated the process. The typical dependence that Indian governments in the
centre have on support from alliance parties in the states has added to the
complexity.
• Powerful interest groups in India, particularly farmers and agriculturalists unions,
have long benefited from political patronage in the form of electricity subsidies.
Patronage has shored up the support of governments at the state level and, because
of the strong interdependencies, at the centre as well. These interest groups are able
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to flex their political muscle to hamper reform. Union groups have also decried the
privatization drive.
• The fractionalisation of the Indian democracy and the political bargaining required
to change policy have resulted in a serious of piecemeal, but palatable, reforms that
have not addressed crucial deficiencies in power policy. This has damaged the
legitimacy of the electricity reform process.
• India's powerful bureaucratic machine has contributed to policy inertia. The
bewildering array of clearances required for power project approval belies the
commitment to private participation that the centre professes.
• Opportunism amongst politicians has drawn out the approval of electricity reforms.
When ruling, parties will support reforms; when not ruling they will oppose them,
particularly politically sensitive policies required by the power reform process. The
frequent change of governments at both state and federal levels has compounded
this issue.
4.4 Conclusion
The examples of the Chinese, Brazilian and Indian electricity reform processes provide
interesting observations about the PCI and its interpretation. Firstly, it is clear from the
experiences in all three that the index cannot be interpreted simplistically and, importantly,
that a sound definition of political risk is crucial. When it can be shown that reform is
required and in the interest of potential investors in a particular sector, high levels of policy
stability and consequently low levels of political risk are, counter-intuitively, dangerous to
the investor because they propagate a disabling policy regime. This is the case particularly
when there are a large number of actors with influence on policy makers who can stifle the
reform process, as in India.
From these comparative examples and an in depth analysis of the political economy of the
Indian Electricity Sector, Henisz's hypothesis that a high rating on the Political Constraints
Index and large degrees of political competition should lead to lower levels of political risk
may be true when risk is defined to include change both beneficial and inimical to the
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operations of the investor. Such a risk rating should not be understood, however, to be
necessarily indicative of a sound investment opportunity. The high level of political
constraints appears to propagate the disabling policy regime as the previous discussion has
shown, to the possible detriment of the investor. There are a number of implications and
caveats:
• The index cannot be used simply to rank countries against each other and thereby
determine safe locations for direct investment. To be useful in the investment
decision, the index must be accompanied by a comprehensive analysis of the
political economy of the sector in question and absolute clarity on the definition of
political risk. Without this analytical support the index may be misinterpreted.
• The index shows only a probability that a path chosen by the executive will be
vetoed by one of the other players in the political process. A comparatively high
index does not show that policy changes are impossible, but rather that they are
difficult to achieve. The result of this is that when policy alterations are tabled
under circumstances of constraint, they are likely to be delayed and possibly
changed themselves. This was illustrated by the passage of the Indian Electricity
Bill, which officially took three years to receive approval from all players and was
only passed after alteration and considerable political deal making+'. This also has
an implication if the index is considered to indicate policy commitment and a safe
investment opportunity: it must still be remembered that deleterious policy changes
can still be effected if all players are in agreement. To use the index appropriately,
the preferences of the various actors must be understood, suggesting that the index
must be augmented with a comprehensive assessment of the political groups and
the dynamic that governs their interaction.
• The index requires analytical support because it acts only as a measure of the
probability of policy change and gives no indication of the likelihood of successful
policy implementation. Although the new Electricity Bill appears to address some
of the critical deficiencies in current power policy, the fact that is has been passed
53 As much of its content had been suggested and debated previously, it can be argued that the Bill rook, in fact, longer than
three years to pass.
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does not imply that it will be put into practice effectively. It is conceivable that
resistance at various levels will delay the implementation of the Bill, causing
further risk for the potential investor. It is advisable for an understanding of the
political environment to be achieved so that the probability of the successful
application of the Bill can be assessed.
The PCI may be a useful tool for determining reform resistance and may have application
in areas other than political risk analysis. There exist opportunities for further research into
this possibility. One possible study could involve devising an empirical test using cross-
country data to further investigate the idea that relatively high PCI scores indicate a
resistance to economic reform.
Such an investigation would begin by identifying countries that have been undergoing
processes of economic liberalisation and determining a numerical rating or ratings that
could be used to indicate reform success. The variables that comprise these ratings should
be easily measurable and strongly linked to the theory of economic liberalisation. They
could include indicators such as the number of liberalising policy changes successfully
passed since the inception of reforms, the success of privatisation drives, the removal of
trade and investment barriers and so forth. Once established, these ratings could be
compared to the PCI for the country in question, using a method such as regression
analysis.
The results of this study should evidence the existence or lack of a link between a country's
PCI and the success of its economic reform endeavours. If such a link can be shown to
exist, the PCI may be useful in assessing the likelihood of success of economic reforms
before their inception, a finding that may be of interest to potential investors, policy makers
and political commentators alike. It may also be possible to generalise the findings to other
policy change initiatives. Further research could also focus on possible linkages between
resistance to policy change and difficulties associated with policy implementation.
4.4.1 Final Remarks
This assignment has shown how the discipline of political risk assessment has shifted its
focus and methodologies in accordance with changes in political thought and
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understandings. As new theories have been debated and the quantity and quality of data
improved, new tools have been proposed in the hope of creating more timeous and accurate
risk assessments. These tools have increasingly taken a quantitative approach to assessment
and, consequently, may be accorded a rigour and accuracy that they do not deserve. The
arguments presented here have shown that, at least for the time being, qualitative
considerations of the country in question and its political economy are indispensable to the
understanding of both the micro and macro risk environments and to the correct
interpretation of tools such as the PCI.
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